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NAKED AND COVERED IN MONTE CARLO: 
A REAPPRAISAL OF OPTION TAXATION 
Eric D. Chason · 
The market for equity options and related derivatives is staggering, 
covering trillions of dollars worth of assets. As a result, the taxation of 
these instruments is inherently important. Moreover, the importance is 
made even more acute by the use of options in creating more complex 
transactions and in avoiding taxes. 
Consider an equity call option, which entitles, but does not obligate, 
its holder to buy stock at a set price at a set time in the future. Option 
theory gives us a way to break the option down into more fundamental 
units. For example, an equity call option over 10,000 shares of stock 
might be equivalent to buying 7500 shares of stock itself 
This financially equivalent synthetic option should serve as the 
model for taxing an actual option. That is not the approach of current 
law. Nevertheless, a Monte-Carlo simulation I wrote shows that current 
law does a good job of approximating the tax liability generated by the 
synthetic option - but only when we view the option in isolation. 
The results are radically different when the investor already owns 
some of the stock subject to the option. If such an investor sells (rather 
than buys) a call option, she has effectively sold a portion of the owned 
stock at fair market value. For example, the issuer of a call option over 
10,000 shares may have effectively sold 7500 shares that she already 
owns. Option theory gives us a way to measure how much stock she has 
effectively sold. Taxing the sale of stock implied by many option and 
related contracts would reflect economic reality and curtail tax-
motivated investments. 
• Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law. I thank Glenn Coven, Rich Hynes, Eric Kades, Michael Knoll, John 
Lee, Alan Meese, and Lawrence Zelenak for comments on prior drafts of this paper. I 
also thank Karen Gurth, Brandon Rogers, Matt Stuart, and Will Woolston for their 
research assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCfiON 
Finding the correct tax treatment of equity options is a crucial 
task for three reasons. First, the market for equity options and other 
equity derivatives is enormous. In June 2006, equity options and 
related contracts covered assets worth almost $6.8 trillion, or about 
one half the U.S. gross domestic product.1 The sheer size of the 
market warrants attention. Second, more complex financial contracts 
are often based on options.2 Finding the right tax treatment of options 
will thus help us find the right tax treatment of these other contracts. 
Third, options and related contracts are often used to avoid taxes.3 
Thus, taxing options correctly would eliminate inefficient tax arbitrage 
and ensure equitable treatment of taxpayers.4 
Let us start with a call option, which entitles (but does not 
1 See Bank for International Settlements, Semiannual OTC Derivatives 
Statistics at end-June 2006, 22B Equity-linked Derivatives by Instrument and Market 
(2006), http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm. 
2 See Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities 
Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119 (1997) (describing 
various financial instruments); cf, e.g., infra Part VI.D (discussing variable prepaid 
forward contracts). 
3 See David A. Schizer, Balance In The Taxation Of Derivative Securities: An 
Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1886 (2004) ("It is well understood 
that aggressive tax planning among high-income individuals and corporations 
represents a threat to the U.S. tax system, and that derivatives are staples of this 
planning."). 
4 See Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective 
Taxation: The Problem With Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX. L. REV. 199, 200 
(1997). Professor Knoll states: 
I d. 
Because the tax treatment of even very basic financial contracts is 
inconsistent, financially sophisticated parties reduced their tax liabilities by 
using innovative financial products and techniques to exploit these 
inconsistencies. In its most extreme form, parties can engage in tax 
arbitrage, the process of buying and selling the same cash flows to generate 
an after-tax cash profit from the different tax treatment of identical cash 
flows. Tax arbitrage represents a serious threat to the tax system because 
taxpayers, by merely adjusting their portfolios, can reduce or even 
eliminate their tax liabilities. 
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obligate) the holder to buy stock at a set price at a certain time in the 
future. For example, Maya might buy a call option over XMPL Corp. 
stock that entitles her to buy 10,000 shares of XMPL Corp. stock for 
$100 per share in five years. Suppose that XMPL Corp. stock is 
currently worth $100 per share. The call gives Maya a valuable right 
because she will enjoy any appreciation in the stock over $100 per 
share without any risk of decline below that price. The Black-Scholes 
modee gives Maya a concrete way of valuing her option. Using that 
model (and other assumptions discussed later), the option is worth 
$350,000.6 
The magic of the Black-Scholes model is that it equates Maya's 
call option with a combination of (1) ownership of XMPL Corp. stock 
itself and (2) borrowed funds. We will see later how Maya's call 
option is equivalent to her owning about 7500 shares of XMPL Corp. 
stock (worth $750,000) purchased partly with borrowed funds of 
$400,000.7 This combination of stock and borrowing has the same net 
value as the call ($350,000). And, it is the starting point in a process 
called delta hedging that will closely approximate the economic return 
on the call option itself. So, we can think of the stock and borrowing 
combination as a synthetic option. 
In due course, this article will explain how delta hedging creates 
synthetic options. The important point for now is that the Black-
Scholes model gives us not only a way to value the call option but also 
to recreate it using stock and borrowing. The Black-Scholes model8 
has been spectacularly successful, winning Nobel prizes for its 
inventors9 and serving as the linchpin for the multi-trillion dollar 
5 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 637 (1973); see also Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational 
Option Pricing, 4 BELLJ.ECON. &MGMT.SCI.141 (1973). 
6 See infra note 25. 
7 See infra note 27. 
8 The more common usage is to refer to the formula as "Black-Scholes." Cf, 
e.g., JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES & OTHER DERIVATIVES 234 (5th ed. 2003) 
(introducing the "Black-Scholes model"). Some refer to it as the Black-Scholes-
Merton model. Cf, e.g., NASSIM T ALEB, DYNAMIC HEDGING 109 (1997) (referring to 
the "Black-Scholes-Merton" model). 
9 Purists might note that there is no "Nobel Prize" in economics as there is for 
peace, physics, etc. Technically, it is the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel and it was awarded to Robert Merton and Myron Scholes 
in 1997 for their work in option pricing theory. Fischer Black was Scholes' coauthor, 
but died before the award was made. See Nobel Prize.org, The Prize in Economic 
Sciences 1997 (1997), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1997/ 
press.html. 
2007] Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo 139 
market for derivatives. It does not, however, served as the basis for 
taxing options. When Maya buys her call option, she is not taxed as if 
she bought XMPL Corp. stock with borrowed funds. Instead, the tax 
treatment is held open while Maya waits to see if she will actually 
exercise (or perhaps sell) the option. In taxation, timing is almost 
everything/0 and long-term deferral can potentially be the same as tax 
forgiveness. 
Prior commentators have argued that tax policy should strive to 
tax economically equivalent transactions similarly.11 Tax policy can 
achieve this goal by what has been termed "bifurcation" - if a 
transaction can be bifurcated or broken down into more fundamental 
units, then the transaction should be taxed based on the tax treatment 
of these units. Inconsistent treatment between the fundamental units 
and the transaction creates the potential for economic distortions, tax 
arbitrage, and inequities. 
Theoretically, then, the proper way to tax Maya's call option is to 
tax her as if she bought 7500 shares of XMPL Corp. stock (worth 
$750,000) purchased partly with borrowed funds of $400,000. Doing so 
is theoretically possible but practically difficult. The primary difficulty 
is that the precise amount of stock and borrowing will need to change 
over time. For example, suppose Maya really did decide to replicate 
the option with the stock and borrowing combination. If XMPL stock 
goes down in value, Maya would need to sell some stock (using the 
proceeds to pay of some of the borrowing she incurred). If XMPL 
stock goes up in value, Maya would need to buy some more stock 
(using additional borrowing to pay for it). So, the synthetic option is a 
dynamic mixture of stock and borrowing, representing countless sales 
and purchases of the underlying stock and changes in the associated 
borrowing. The 7500 shares financed in part with $400,000 of 
borrowed funds is merely the starting point. Taxing the transactions 
that occur after the starting point would be administratively infeasible, 
even though the approach is theoretically correct. 
Nonetheless, this approach is a valuable policy tool, and it is 
possible to examine the taxation of the synthetic option and its 
countless transactions using a computer simulation. The simulation 
10 See, e.g., Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L. Rev. 
383, 384 (1999) ("Issues relating to tax deferral and time value of money are probably 
the most important areas of tax study."); see also Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in 
Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986). 
11 See, e.g., David Weisbach, 'Fax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 
TAX L. REV. 491, 539 (1995) ("Bifurcation provides a theoretical framework for 
taxing hybrids."). 
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tells us what the expected tax consequences will be on that dynamic 
combination of stock and borrowing that replicates the call option. 
Ideally, the tax consequences on the actual option would be the same 
as those produced by the simulation. In reality, we should aim for a 
practical system that achieves results roughly the same as the ideal 
results produced by the simulation. Later in this article, I report the 
results of a computer simulation I created using the MATLAB 
programming language. Surprisingly, the simulation shows that 
current-law treatment of options is, for the most part, the best 
approximation of the theoretical ideal. The current-law taxation of 
options survives the toughest test that tax theory can apply, but with 
one exception. 
That exception relates to so-called covered calls, which are the 
sale of a call combined with ownership of the stock.12 To illustrate, 
suppose we change the example so that Maya already owns 10,000 
shares of XMPL Corp. stock. Her adjusted basis in the stock is zero, 
meaning she would realize gain of $1 million if she sold the stock 
today. Let us also assume that Maya sells a call option over 10,000 
shares rather than buying one. So, she is now obligated to sell 10,000 
shares of XMPL Corp. stock for $100 per share in five years if the 
buyer exercises its right to do so. (And, the buyer will exercise its right 
only if the stock is over $100 per share at that time.) Maya receives 
cash of about $350,000 for selling this option. Even though Maya 
receives cash of $350,000 today, she is not taxed today under current 
law. As before, she waits for five years to see whether she must 
perform on the call. 
Maya's call option is the equivalent of her buying 7500 shares 
(worth $750,000) purchased partly with borrowed funds of $400,000. 
In contrast, when Maya sells the call, the equivalent combination is 
inverted. Now, it is as if she sells 7500 shares (obtaining funds of 
$750,000) and lends a portion of the proceeds she obtained (again, 
$400,000). Thus, Maya should be taxed as if she sold 7500 shares of 
XMPL stock today, recognizing immediate gain of $750,000. Instead, 
current law improperly allows Maya to defer the tax consequences of 
the implicit sale for five years while she waits to see if she is called 
upon to perform under the option. 
The article is organized as follows. Part II is an overview of option 
theory, which will be used throughout the article. Part III shows how 
options challenge the tax system and summarizes how previous 
12 The same analysis will apply to protective puts, equity collars, and variable 
prepaid contracts. See infra Part VI. 
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proposals would deal with this challenge. Part IV shows how the tax 
system can achieve the ideal by taxing true options according to 
financially equivalent synthetic options, created from transactions in 
the underlying stock and debt. Part V explores the taxation of "naked 
options" (i.e., option positions that are not coupled with a position in 
the actual stock itself) using some simple examples and a more 
realistic Monte-Carlo simulation. After examining how naked options 
would be taxed under the synthetic-option ideal, Part V concludes 
that current law may well be the best practical model available. Part 
VI analyzes covered calls and related contracts in a similar fashion. 
Practical steps can be taken to improve the taxation of covered calls 
and protective puts - namely, treating them as a partial sale of the 
owned asset. Part VII has some concluding thoughts. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OPTION THEORY 
A. Option Terms Defined 
This article uses terms of art relating to options and short selling. 
For convenience, this section defines these terms of art. 
1. Long Call: A call option entitles (but does not obligate) the 
holder to buy stock at a set price at a set time in the future. 
The holder must pay a premium for this right. We will call the 
position of a call holder the "long call." 
2. Short Call: The holder of a call option has a counterparty (the 
call writer) who receives the premium and must sell the stock 
if the call is exercised. We will call the position of the call 
writer the "short call." 
3. Covered Call: A covered call is simply a short call that is 
combined with the underlying asset. Without the underlying 
asset, the call is naked. 
4. Long Put: A put option entitles (but does not obligate) the 
holder to sell stock at a set price at a set time in the future. 
The holder must pay a premium for this right. We will call the 
position of a put holder the "long put." 
5. Protective Put: A protective put is simply a long put that is 
combined with the underlying asset. Without the underlying 
asset, the put is naked. 
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6. Short Put: The holder of a put option has a counterparty (the 
put writer) who receives the premium and must buy the stock 
if the put is exercised. We will call the position of the put 
writer the "short put." 
An option is specified by the asset (e.g., 100 shares of XYZ Corp. 
stock), expiration date (e.g., three years from today), and the exercise 
price (e.g., $50 per share).13 This article focuses on options to buy or 
sell zero-dividend, publicly-traded stock. In addition, the options in 
this article are assumed to be "European," meaning the holder can 
exercise the option only at the expiration date.14 
The final concept of this section is short selling. As we will see 
later, the magic of the Black -Scholes method for valuing options is 
that it equates options with easy-to-value financial positions: debt 
(either borrowing or lending) and stock (either owning or selling 
short). Borrowing, lending, and owning stock should be familiar. 
Selling short may not be, but it is simply the inverse of buying stock. A 
leading textbook on investments summarizes short selling as follows: 
A short sale allows investors to profit from a decline in a 
security's price. An investor borrows a share of stock from a 
broker and sells it. Later, the short-seller must purchase a 
share of the same stock in the market to replace the share 
that was borrowed. This is called covering the short 
position .... 
The short-seller anticipates the stock price will fall, so that the 
share can be purchased at a lower price than it was initially 
sold for; the short-seller will then reap a profit. Short-sellers 
must not only replace the shares but also pay the lender of 
the security any dividends paid during the short sale. 
In practice, the shares loaned out for a short sale are typically 
provided by a short-seller's brokerage firm .... The owner of 
the shares will not even know that the shares have been lent 
to the short -seller. If the owner wishes to sell the shares, the 
brokerage firm will simply borrow shares from another 
investor. Therefore, the short sale may have an indefinite 
13 ZVI BoDIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 54 (Christina Kouvelis ed., 6th ed. 2005). The 
exercise price is often called the strike price. The two terms are synonymous. 
14 See HULL, supra note 8, at 705. American options can be exercised at any time 
before expiration. See id. at 700. 
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term. However, if the brokerage firm cannot locate new 
shares to replace the ones sold, the short-seller will need to 
repay the loan immediately by purchasing shares in the 
market and turning them over to the brokerage firm to close 
out the loan. 15 
143 
As we will see in Part III.B, taxpayers often combine options in 
order to approximate the economics of a short sale while avoiding the 
short sale's adverse tax treatment. Part VI will present a system for 
treating such combinations as short sales for purposes of taxation. 
B. Put-Call Parity 
This section briefly describes the put-call parity, which relates the 
price of stocks, bonds, put options, and call options. As Part liLA 
demonstrates, the put-call parity shows that the current-law taxation 
of options is internally inconsistent. Part III.B further reveals how the 
put-call parity is used to create an approximate short sale, which 
avoids the adverse tax consequences of short sales under current law. 
Put-call parity relates the value of the stock and options given any 
strike price (K) and time to exercise of the option (1) as follows: 
S: a share of the stock 
c: a call option on the stock, exercisable at time T for 
strike price K 
p: a put option on the stock, exercisable at time T for_ 
strike price K 
B: a zero-coupon bond that will be worth the strike 
price K at the time of exercise T 6 
The put-call parity states: 
17 S + p = B +c. 
Detailed demonstrations of the put-call parity are available in the 
legal literature.18 The most intuitive way to approach the put-call 
15 BODIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 91-92. 
16 Because of the future value, we know that B=exp(-r*T). 
17 HULL, supra note 8, at 174-75. See generally infra note 18. 
ts I See, e.g., MichaelS. Kno I, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 
61, 72-74 (2002). 
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parity is to note that owning a bond is equivalent to owning stock, 
owning a put, and writing a call. In other words, 
B = S + p- c. 
Suppose that the strike price of the options and the value of the bond 
at maturity are all equal to $100 (i.e., K=$100). We know that the left 
side of the equation will equal $100 (i.e., B=$100) regardless of the 
price of the stock. As for the right side of the equation, we consider 
two cases. In the first case, suppose that the price of the stock is less 
than $100. The value of the call is zero, and the investor will exercise 
the put, selling the stock for $100. So, the right side is worth $100 in 
this first case. In the second case, suppose that the price of the stock is 
greater than $100. The value of the put is zero, and the investor will be 
called upon to sell the stock for $100 under the call. So, again, the 
right side is worth $100 in this second case. Thus, the right side of the 
equation is always worth $100. 
Part III.A will show how the put-call parity can be used for tax 
avoidance. Each of the four transactions listed in the put-call parity 
can be recreated by a combination of the other three. For example, we 
just saw how a bond can be recreated using a combination of stock, a 
put, and a short call. However, the tax treatment of the bond is 
different from the tax treatment of the combination. Thus, the put-call 
parity might allow taxpayers to choose the tax treatment they prefer. 
C. Delta and the Binomial Model 
Although the put-call parity demonstrates how taxpayers might 
use options to exploit arbitrage opportunities, it does not provide a 
unique method for valuing options. The value of a put is dependent on 
the value of a call (or vice versa) under put-call parity. Option-pricing 
theory supplies the unique price by showing how an option can be 
replicated using only stock and debt. Replicating the option using only 
stock and debt requires more complex analysis than does the put-call 
parity. Before turning to a more realistic model in the next subsection, 
we can see the essence of how this replication works using a simple 
"binomial" model. 
Suppose that ABC stock is worth $30 today and we know it will 
be worth either $21 or $45 in one year. What, for example, is the value 
of a call option to sell ABC stock for $33, exercisable in one year? Let 
us assume that ABC stock has no dividends, and that the interest rate 
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. 100/ 19 IS 10. 
We know that the option will be worth $12 if the stock goes up to 
$45 and will be worth $0 if the stock goes down to $21. We can view 
the option as the following tree, with the "?" representing the current 





The key to valuing the option under the binomial model is observe 
how sensitive the return on the option is to changes in the price of the 
stock. In this example, a $24 swing in the stock price (i.e., from $21 to 
$45) results in a $12 swing in the return on the option (i.e., from $0 to 
$12). So, the sensitivity of the option to the price of the stock is 50%. 
This figure is known as the "delta" of the option. 
We can replicate this sensitivity by buying 0.50 shares of ABC 
stock. The 0.50 shares are just as sensitive to movements in the stock 
price as is the option itself. Nonetheless, the 0.50 shares are only part 
of the replication. They would be worth $10.50 at the end of the year 
if the stock price fell to $21, but the option itself would be worthless. 
This discrepancy is easy enough to fix. We can assume that the initial 
purchase was made partly with borrowed funds - borrowed in an 
amount that require a $10.50 repayment in one year. Repayment 
would thus wipe out the value of the shares if the share price fell $21. 
Alternatively, if the share price goes up to $45, then the 0.50 shares 
would be worth $22.50. Paying back the $10.50 would leave $12.00 -
the same as the actual option. So, we have perfectly replicated the 
option by owning 0.50 shares subject to an obligation to repay $10.50 
at the end of the one year period. 
The initial cost of the option should equal the initial cost of the 
replicating portfolio. The 0.50 shares costs $15.00 at the start of the 
one year period. The $10.50 final liability brings loan proceeds of 
$9.5020 at the start of the one year period. Thus, it costs $5.50 to buy 
the replicating portfolio, and the market price of the actual option 
should also be $5.50. 
19 See David M. Hasen, A Realization-based Approach to the Taxation of 
Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 431 (2004). 
20 $9.50*exp(O.l0*1)=$10.50. 
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In summary, the binomial approach shows that a stylized call 
option can be replicated with a combination of stock and debt. The 
key to this replication is delta, which is the sensitivity of the price of 
an option to changes in the price of the stock. The replication is 
performed as follows: 
• Buy delta shares of stock. In our example, this was 0.50 
shares, costing $15.00. 
• Pay for part of the purchase with an out-of-pocket 
contribution that equals the value of the option. In our 
example, this was $5.50. 
• Pay the remainder of the purchase with borrowed funds. In 
our example, this initial borrowing of $9.50, leading to 
repayment of $10.50 in one year. 
The binomial model is obviously not the real world. Stock prices 
move constantly and can take a multitude of values. The next 
subsection will show how one can extend the basic approach just 
described in order to replicate real-world options. As in this 
subsection, the key to real-world replication is measuring the delta of 
an option. 
D. Delta Hedging and the Black-Scholes Model 
Replicating real-world options with stock and debt is critical to 
the approach of this article, which urges that options should be taxed 
according to the tax treatment of the replicating portfolio. The Black-
Scholes model purports to replicate real-world options, even though 
stock prices are moving randomly and constantly. At its core, the 
Black-Scholes model is the same as the binomial model. Both hold 
that an option can be replicated by owning "delta" shares of stock, 
combined with an appropriate amount of borrowing. Recall that delta 
is the sensitivity of the option price to changes in the stock price. So, 
an investor faces the same risk by owning delta shares and owning one 
option. As with the binomial model, the replicating portfolio also 
includes an appropriate amount of borrowing. 
Recall from Part II.A that there are four types of options - long 
calls, short calls, long puts, and short puts. The Black-Scholes formula 
produces a price and a delta21 for each of these four.22 Thus, each can 
21 The so-called Greek letters describe the sensitivity of an option price to 
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be replicated with a position in equity and debt. Long calls and short 
puts have positive deltas, meaning they are replicated with stock 
ownership and borrowing. Short calls and long puts have negative 
deltas, meaning they are replicated with short selling and lending. 
Option Replicating Position Replicating Position 
in Stock in Debt 
Long Call Ownership Borrowing 
Short Call Short Selling Lending 
Long Put Short Selling Lending 
Short Put Ownership Borrowing 
The derivation of the Black-Scholes formula is beyond the scope 
of this article, although the approach is similar to the binomial model. 
In the binomial model, we needed to know the possible values of the 
stock in the next period. In the Black-Scholes model, we assume that 
the stock price moves randomly.23 Now, we need to know the volatility 
of the stock. Expanding the example from the prior subsection, 
suppose that ABC stock is worth $30 today and has volatility 
(standard deviation) of 30%. Again, we are looking for the price and 
delta of an option to sell ABC stock for $33, exercisable in one year. 
As before, let us assume that ABC stock has no dividends, and that 
market inputs. Delta is the most significant of the Greek letters, as it measures 
sensitivity of the option price to changes in the stock price. Another is theta, which 
measures the sensitivity of an option to passage of time. See HULL, supra note 8, at 
309-11. Because the passage of time is constant, there is no need to hedge for theta. 
See id. at 311. Another Greek letter is gamma, which measures the sensitivity of delta 
to changes in the stock price. See id. at 312. Although gamma is critical to real-world 
option traders, it is not addressed in this article. The reason is that gamma cannot be 
hedged with the underlying asset itself. Rather, it can be hedged only with other 
options. See id. at 313. The other two Greek letters are rho (which measures 
sensitivity to interest rate changes) and vega (which measures sensitivity to changes in 
volatility). See id. at 316-19. For the sake of simplicity, the model used in this article 
will assume that volatility and interest rates are constant. 
22 Technically, we can derive all of the deltas from the long call delta, which is 
produced by the Black-Scholes equation. Note that the long call delta is always 
positive, between 0 and 1. The short call delta is simply the inverse of the long call 
delta (and therefore between -1 and 0). The long put delta is the long call delta minus 
one (and therefore between -1 and 0). The short put delta is the inverse of the long 
put delta (and therefore between 0 and 1). 
23 The Black-Scholes model assumes that the return on the stock is a random 
variable with a lognormal distribution. 
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the interest rate is 10%.24 
The Black-Scholes formula gives a value of the option of $3.639325 
and a delta of 0.5658.26 To make the numbers more meaningful, let us 
suppose that we are interested in replicating an option covering 10,000 
shares. We can take the same approach as before in order to replicate 
the call option: 
• Buy delta shares of stock. In our example, this was 5658 
shares, costing $169,733. 
• Pay for part of the purchase with an out-of-pocket 
contribution that equals the value of the option. In our 
example, this was $36,393. 
• Pay the· remainder of the purchase with borrowed funds. In 
our example, this borrowing is $133,340.27 
The difference between the Black-Scholes model and the 
binomial method of the prior subsection is that the stock price - and 
24 Hasen, supra note 19, at 438-39. 
25 I have used the MATLAB programming language to produce the Black-
Scholes calculations in this article. The function that produces the option price is 
blsprice, which takes as its inputs the price of the stock, the strike of the option, the 
interest rate, the time to expiration, and the volatility of the stock. Here, blsprice (30, 
33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns 3.6393. 
As another example, recall XMPL Corp. from Part I. The call had a strike price 
of $100 and a term of five years, and the current price of the stock was also $100. I 
used an interest rate of 4.55% and a stock volatility of 29.92%. (My goal was to create 
a realistic option with a round price and delta, but these numbers are typical.) In 
MATLAB, blsprice (100, 100, 0.0455, 5, 0.2992) returns $35.0004. After multiplying 
by 10,000 (the number of shares covered), I rounded down from $350,004 to $350,000 
for sake of convenience. 
26 The MATLAB function that produces the delta is blsdelta, which takes the 
same inputs as blsprice. Here blsdelta (30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns 0.5658. 
27 $169,733-$36,393. 
As another example, recall XMPL Corp. from Part I. The call had a strike price 
of $100 and a term of five years, and the current price of the stock was also $100. I 
used an interest rate of 4.55% and a stock volatility of 29.92%. (My goal was to create 
a realistic option with a round price and delta, but these numbers are typical.) In 
MATLAB, blsdelta (100, 100, 0.0455, 5, 0.2992) returns 0.7500. After multiplying by 
10,000 (the number of shares covered), we obtain 7500 shares that replicate the 
option. These shares cost $750,000. As the option price is $350,000, see supra note 25, 
the equity in the synthetic option must be $350,000. So, the XMPL option is replicated 
with a purchased of 7500 shares, worth $750,000, financed in part with debt of 
$400,000. 
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therefore delta - can change before the expiration of the option. 
Therefore, we must rebalance the replicating portfolio periodically. 
For example, suppose that we are to rebalance the replicating 
portfolio weekly. At the end of the first week, the stock price has 
jumped from $30 to $30.31.28 The passage of a week and the jump in 
the stock price causes a change in delta, which is now 0.5763.29 The 
number of shares in the replicating portfolio must now be increased 
from 5658 to 5763. The additional 105 shares cost $3183, paid for by 
additional borrowing. 
The process of rebalancing the replicating portfolio is known as 
"delta hedging." The goal of delta hedging is always to own a number 
of shares that equals the delta of the option that is being replicated. This 
way, the stock ownership and the true option have the same sensitivity 
to movements in the stock price. Over time, changes in the stock price 
will cause changes in delta. These changes will force the investor to 
rebalance the portfolio. This process is detailed in Appendix A. 
The goal of Part V will be to implement those steps with a 
computer simulation and to measure the tax consequences to an 
investor. Implementing the actual trading model is simple, and can be 
done with a few lines of computer code.30 The true difficulty comes in 
measuring the tax consequences that an investor would face by 
creating a synthetic option. 
Ill. 0ITIONS AND CHALLENGES TO THE TAX SYSTEM 
A. Option Taxation and the Put-Call Parity 
The tax aspects of financial innovation have spawned a rich 
literature in the law reviews.31 Perhaps the seminal article is Financial 
28 The Black-Scholes price of the option is $37,560. By comparison, the 
replicating portfolio is worth $37,897. The 5658 shares of stock are worth $171,494 
(i.e., 5658*$30.31). The initial debt of $133,340 has grown to $133,597 (i.e., $133,340 
*exp(0.1/52) ). 
29 In MA TLAB, blsdelta (30.31 , 33, 0.10, 51152, 0.30) returns 0.5763. 
3
° Cf, e.g., PAOLO BRANDIMARTE, NUMERICAL METHODS IN FINANCE: A 
MATLAB-BASED INTRODUCTION 65 (2002) (giving a MATLAB-based Monte-Carlo 
simulation for option valuation). 
31 For example, Tax Law Review had an entire issue devoted to the topic. See 
David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and 
Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731 (1995); Mark 
P. Gergen, Afterword: Apocalypse Not?, 50 TAX L. REV. 833 (1995); Deborah H. 
Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. 
REV. 571 (1995); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital 
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Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, in which Professor 
Warren showed that the fundamental problem of current option 
taxation is its inconsistency with the taxation of other transactions.32 
First, let us consider the taxation of options, which Professor Warren 
summarizes as follows: 
The purchase of an option is treated as a capital expenditure, 
and there are generally no tax consequences to either party 
until its exercise or disposition. If the option lapses without 
exercise, the option writer is treated as if he had sold the 
option. If a call is exercised, the writer includes the premium 
in the amount realized on the sale of the asset, and the holder 
of the call includes the premium in cost basis. If a put is 
exercised, the writer reduces basis by the amount of the 
premium, and the holder of the put reduces amount realized 
by the same amount. If an option is sold prior to exercise, 
gain or loss is recognized, with the nature of the gain 
generally determined by that of the underlying asset. Finally, 
many . . . options are written for settlement by a cash 
payment from one party to the other on the date of 
performance, rather than by the actual delivery of the 
property specified in the contract. Such payments with 
respect to these cash settlement options . . . are taxable 
events.33 
The tax system treats options as "contingent-return instruments," 
waiting to apply a tax until the option has resolved itself. Similar 
treatment applies to corporate stock itself. Dividends on corporate 
Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643 (1995); Jeff Strnad, Commentary: Taxing New Financial 
Products in a Second-Best World: Bifurcation and Integration, 50 TAX L. REV. 545 
(1995); David A. Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 TAX 
L. REV. 491 (1995). 
32 Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 
107 HARV. L. REv. 460 (1993) [hereinafter Warren 1993]. 
33 Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 464-65 (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted); accord Alvin C. Warren, Jr., U.S. Income Taxation of New Financial 
Products, 88 J. PUB. EcoN. 899, 901-02 (2004) [hereinafter Warren 2004]. The 
historical development of option taxation is nicely summarized in Bruce Kayle, 
Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection of Income From an 
Option to Acquire Property, 48 TAX L. REV. 233, 237-42 (1993). As this article does 
not address the characterization of option gain and loss, the current-law rules dealing 
with character are not addressed. A summary of those rules can be found at David H. 
Shapiro, Taxation of Equity Derivatives, 188 TAX MGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) 'j[ II.A.3 
(2003). 
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stock are taxed currently, but appreciation on stock escapes taxation 
until the stock is sold or exchanged.34 
Contrast this treatment with "fixed-return instruments," such as 
bonds. Bonds generate taxable interest income on an annual basis. 
Even if the actual payment of interest is deferred during the life of the 
bond, the Internal Revenue Code imputes annual interest under its 
"original issue discount" regime.35 
Options potentially allow taxpayers to select between contingent-
return and fixed-return tax treatment.36 The put-call parity implicates 
the tax system because the taxation of the four elements is internally 
inconsistent. Recall that the put-call parity holds that stock plus a put 
equals a bond plus a call.37 Algebraically -
S+p=B+c 
The left side of the equation (S+p) represents contingent-return 
instruments (except insofar as the stock pays dividends). The right 
side of the equation (B+c) represents a contingent-return and a fixed-
return instrument. 
An investor could use the put-call parity to create a synthetic 
bond. Bonds are the prototype for all fixed-return transactions. 
However, the put-call parity allows one to receive the economic 
return of a bond while paying tax on a contingent-return basis. An 
investor could replicate a bond by buying the stock, buying a put, and 
selling a call.38 Why would a taxpayer do this? A true bond generates 
taxable interest income on an annual basis, whether or not the bond is 
sold. In contrast, the stock, put, and call have no tax consequences 
until the sale or (in the case of the put or call) exercise or expiration.39 
Although a taxpayer can manipulate the timing of income using 
put-call parity, manipulating the character is more difficult. Before the 
enactment of section 1258, taxpayers might be able to convert the 
ordinary income received from bonds into the capital gains received 
from stocks and options. Section 1258 would now treat the synthetic 
bond as a "conversion transaction," resulting in ordinary-income 
34 See Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 463 (citation omitted); Warren 2004, supra 
note 33, at 901. 
35 See Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 462-63; Warren 2004, supra note 33, at 900. 
36 See Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 470; Warren 2004, supra note 33, at 902. 
37 See supra Part II. B. 
38 Algebraically, the put-call parity can be rewritten as B=S+p-c. 
39 Most or all of the gain on the synthetic bond would be subject to ordinary 
income rates, rather than capital gains rates. See I.R.C. § 1258. 
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treatment. Section 1258 would not, however, alter the timing of 
income on the synthetic bond.40 As before, the synthetic bond would 
likely result in contingent-return treatment. 
The put-call parity might also be used to achieve an effective 
short sale of stock. Rearranging the equation we see -
-S = p- c- B 
In other words, one can replicate the short sale of stock by borrowing 
cash, buying a put, and selling a call. 
Suppose that Maya currently owns 100 shares of stock, which has 
fair market value of $30 per share and an adjusted basis of $0. If Maya 
sold the stock she actually owns, then she would pay tax on $3000 of 
gain. Before 1997, Maya could have executed a "short sale against the 
box."41 Rather than selling the shares she actually owns, Maya would 
execute a short sale over 100 shares of stock (selling 100 shares that 
were borrowed from a broker). In 1997, Congress enacted the 
constructive-sale rules of section 1259.42 If an investor executes a short 
sale and also owns appreciated shares of the same stock, then he is 
deemed to have sold the owned stock (rather than the borrowed 
stock). The constructive-sale rules apply to a short sale or any 
comparable transactions that "have the effect of eliminating 
substantially all of the taxpayer's risk of loss and opportunity for 
income or gain with respect to the [owned security]."43 So, Maya 
would face taxable gain on the 100 shares of if she executes a short 
sale or a synthetic short sale, constructed with options.44 Using put-call 
parity, Maya could create a synthetic short sale by buying a put, 
selling a call, and borrowing money. Using the notation introduced 
above, we describe a short sale (i.e., a negative share of stock) as 
follows: 
-S = p- c- B 
Again, suppose that the stock is worth $30 today, and Maya wants to 
execute a synthetic short sale. She would borrow $30, buy a put, and 
40 I.R.C. § 1258. 
41 The short sale is "against the box" because Maya already holds the same 
shares that she is shorting. 
42 See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1312, 1343 (2001). 
43 See id. at 1344 n.104 (quoting JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., 
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION IN 1997 (Comm. Print 1997)). 
44 See I.R.C. § 1259. 
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sell a call. The term of the put and call would have to be the same, and 
the exercise price of the each would have to be the future value of $30. 
So, if the term of the option is one year and the interest rate is 5%, the 
exercise price would need to be $31.5445 for both the call and the put. 
In conceptual terms, the long put and short call eliminates any risk of 
upward or downward movement in the stock for one year. The 
borrowing allows Maya to access the value of the owned stock today, 
rather than having to wait to sell it. The resulting synthetic short sale 
perfectly mimics a true short sale and would be taxed as a constructive 
sale under current law. 
B. Equity Collars 
In his 2001 article Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, Dean 
Schizer notes how taxpayers can approximate a short sale against the 
box, but still avoid the constructive sale rules, with an equity collar.46 
Like the synthetic short sale, an equity collar combines a long put with 
a short call. The difference, however, is that the equity collar has a 
spread in exercise prices between the two options. 
Let us return to Maya and her ABC stock currently worth $30. 
An equity collar might be a long put with an exercise price of $27 and 
a short call with an exercise price of $33. Here, there is a spread of $6 
between the two exercise prices - probably enough of a spread to 
avoid the constructive sale rules.47 The following illustrates the return 
on a short sale of ABC stock and the equity collar just described. The 
horizontal axis is the price of the stock in one year. The vertical axis is 
the gross return (above or below the current stock price of $30) on the 
transactions in one year. 
4~ $31.54 is the future value of $30 after one year at 5% interest ($30*e"0.05). 
4
b See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1345-47. 
47 Dean Schizer reports that the folk wisdom of the New York tax bar is that a 
spread of 10% to 20% of the value of the owned asset should avoid the constructive 
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The illustration shows how similar an equity collar is to a short sale. 
Despite the similarities, the short-sale triggers the constructive sale 
rules, whereas the equity collar does not. 
Economically, however, an equity collar is a partial short sale. 
This article will urge that the equity collar should be taxed as a 
constructive sale (regardless of the spread). Determining the actual 
extent to which an equity collar is a short sale (e.g., 50%, 75%) is no 
trivial matter. The put-call parity does not supply the answer to this 
question, because it deals only with long puts and short calls that 
perfectly replicate a short sale. In order to find the degree to which an 
equity collar replicates (however imperfectly) a short sale, one must 
turn to the Black-Scholes model and the model's key concept of 
"delta." 
We can easily determine the initial short sale implied by the 
equity collar just described. The delta on the put is -0.202048 and the 
delta on the call is ~0.5658.49 So, the delta on the collar is the sum of 
the two, or -0.7678. If the collar covered 10,000 shares, Maya has 
essentially executed a short sale over 7678 of those shares. Applying 
the constructive sale rules of section 1259 to the implicit short sale 
48 In MATLAB, blsdelta (30, 27, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns -0.2020 for the put. 
49 In MA TLAB, blsdelta (30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns 0.5658 for the call. See 
supra text accompanying note 26. Because we are dealing with a short call, we take 
the inverse of the given delta. 
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means that Maya would be treated as having sold up to 7678 shares of 
ABC stock. There are some serious (but surmountable) complications 
with this approach. One is that delta depends on the volatility of a 
stock, which is not readily determinable. Another is that delta is 
constantly fluctuating along with fluctuating stock prices. These issues 
are fully dealt with in Part VI. 
C. Academic Proposals 
Because of the size of the market for options and their use in tax 
avoidance, option taxation has attracted considerable attention from 
legal academics. This section summarizes some of the existing 
commentary, especially as it relates to the approach of this article. 
1. Spanning Method 
In his 1993 article, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual 
Framework, Professor Strnad identifies universality and consistency as 
ideals that the tax system should strive to achieve in the taxation of 
financial transactions.50 "Universality requires that the tax system 
specify a tax treatment for every possible transaction."51 Universality 
gives taxpayers certainty about the tax treatment of transactions. The 
second goal is consistency. "A tax system is consistent if and only if 
every cash flow pattern has a unique tax treatment. In such a system, 
it is not possible to manipulate tax outcomes by repackaging cash 
flows into different financial vehicles."52 The discussion of the put-call 
party in Part III.A showed the inconsistency of taxing options the 
same way as pure equity. 
Professor Strnad notes that a bifurcation approach accomplishes 
the goals of universality and consistency. Bifurcation is accomplished 
as follows: First, we see if a transaction can be broken down into 
constituent parts. Second, we identify tax treatment of each part. 
Third, we aggregate the tax results on the constituent parts. This 
bifurcation approach is consistent and universal. Another favorable 
aspect of bifurcation is its continuity. A system is continuous if 
transactions that are nearly identical have nearly identical tax 
treatments. 53 Thus, "small changes in any [transaction] will not cause a 
50 Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 569, 572-73 (1994). 
51 /d. 
52 !d. at 573. 
53 See generally supra note 50. 
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'jump' in the tax results."54 Equity collars have a discontinuous tax 
treatment, because if the spread between the put and call is too 
narrow, they trigger the constructive sale rules.55 As a result, small 
changes in the spread can cause large changes in the tax 
consequences. 
Professor Strnad analyzes the taxation of options under a stylized 
model called the "spanning method," under which a stock that will 
take one of five known values in two years. 56 This model does not 
reflect the real world, and may well be incapable of capturing the 
effect that innumerable price fluctuations have on the performance of 
real-world options. Like Professor Strnad's spanning method, the 
delta-hedging model of this article relies on bifurcation to examine the 
taxation of options. The delta-hedging model improves upon the 
spanning method, however, by its ability to produce tax results for 
real-world options. 
2. Quasi-Mark-to-Market Approach 
Professor Hasen used delta hedging to support his proposal of 
what he calls a quasi-mark-to-market approach for taxing options.57 
Hasen recognizes that delta hedging produces results that are 
equivalent to actual options and would base the taxation of actual 
options on a hypothetical delta hedge. As in this article, Hasen's delta 
hedging model bifurcates a call option into stock and debt. Yet, 
Hasen's model departs from the bifurcation ideal by not taxing the 
stock component according to current law. Instead, Hasen would tax 
the stock component of the synthetic option by marking it to market. 
Let us recall how delta hedging can be used to replicate a long 
cal1.58 The Black-Scholes formula produces a number "delta," which is 
the sensitivity of the price of the long call to movements in the price of 
the stock. An investor can theoretically replicate an option by buying 
a number of shares equal to this delta, financing part of the purchase 
with borrowing. Consider the following example that Professor Hasen 
uses to describe his delta-hedging approach: 
ABC stock is worth $30 on Day 1 and has moderate volatility 
of 30%. On Day 1, when the risk-free rate of interest is 10%, 
54 Strnad, supra note 50, at 598. 
55 See supra Part III.B. 
56 See Strnad, supra note 50, at 593 & n.65. 
57 See Hasen, supra note 19, at 443. 
58 See id. at 430--31. 
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B sells A an option to buy ABC stock at $33 on Day 2, one 
year later. The price of the option is $3.64. At all times from 
Day 1 to Day 2 B is the record owner of the ABC stock. ABC 
stock pays no dividends.59 
157 
Hasen reports that the delta equals 56.75%!0 A's taxable year ends six 
months later, at which time Hasen assumes that the stock has 
increased in value to $35.08.61 Hasen reports an option value of $5 and 
a delta of 73.57%.62 
A synthetic option is initialized by the purchase of delta=0.5675 
shares of ABC stock, which costs $17.03. The purchase is financed by 
$3.64 (the price of the call) out of pocket and $13.39 of borrowing.63 
Six months later, the synthetic option will be represented by 
delta=0.7357 shares (worth $25.81) and borrowing of $20.81 (i.e., the 
value of the shares minus the value of the option). Professor Hasen's 
goal is finding the appropriate tax treatment for this six-month period. 
The problem, however, is that a synthetic option involves daily or 
more frequent trading to ensure that the number of shares always 
equals delta. We cannot know what tax consequences these trades and 
the related borrowing have based solely on the value at the end of six 
months. 
In order to approximate the actual tax consequences, Hasen 
posits a single adjustment to the portfolio midway between Day 1 and 
the end of the taxable year six months later. The interim adjustment 
comes from the hypothetical purchase of 0.1682 new shares, reflecting 
the increase in delta from 0.5675 to 0.7357. Hasen deems this purchase 
to have been made at a share price of $32.54 (i.e., the midway point 
between $35.08 and $30).64 
Professor Hasen would tax the initial stock purchase and the 
interim purchase on a mark-to-market basis. This system, which he 
calls a "quasi-mark-to-market approach," produces gains as follows. 
59 ld. at 438-39. 
60 ld. at 439. Hasen's number for delta is slightly off. The correct delta is 56.58%. 
61 Id. at 444. 
62 Jd. Both of these numbers are slightly off. The correct price is $5.03, and the 
correct delta is 73.56%. 
63 /d. at 439. 
64 See id. at 447. This assumption seems contrary to Hasen's goal of avoiding 
"off-market transactions." Cf id. at 443 ("[I]f one simplified using off-market 
transactions to approximate option transactions, one would substantially undercut the 
utility of using the dynamic hedging model in the first place, because the value of the 
model lies in its establishment of transactional equivalents."). 
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There are gains of $2.88 on the initial purchase65 and $0.43 on the 
interim· purchase.66 As a result, Hasen would subject A to short-term 
capital gains of $3.31. Professor Hasen appears also to allow A an 
interest deduction of $0.77 on the imputed debt.67 The net income 
would be $2.54. 
This result obviously deviates from the realization rule. Under the 
realization rule, A would have no gain at all for year one, because she 
has only bought nondividend-paying stock and borrowed money. 
Indeed, A might even be entitled to an interest deduction. Professor 
Hasen justifies deviation from the realization rule by addressing the 
"policy question of whether it is appropriate to tax the gain on the 
value of the underlying asset during the pendency of the option or to 
wait until some future date."68 The realization rule gives one, rather 
clear, answer to this policy question, although there is no reason 
Hasen should not argue for a better answer.69 
But his answer points to full (not quasi) mark-to-market 
treatment of the option itself. In Hasen's example, the option price 
has increased only $1.36 (from $3.64 to $5.00), although he would 
impute income of $2.54. Hasen wants to avoid marking the option to 
market to "avoid the difficulty of actually computing the spot prices of 
the option on a daily basis (or in principle even more frequently). "70 
Yet, taxing the option on a mark-to-market basis would typically 
require only a single year-end valuation of the option.71 In fact, valuing 
65 0.5675*($35.08-$30). 
66 0.1682*(35.08-32.54). 
~ $ See Hasen, supra note 19, at 445 & n.146 (calculating interest of 0.12 on the 
borrowing associated with the interim purchase and calculating interest of $0.65 on 
the borrowing associated with the initial purchase). 
68 See id. at 445. 
69 It is likely that most academics would support a fuller mark-to-market regime. 
See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, 
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L REV. 861, 861-62 (1997). 
Professor Zelinsky states: 
/d. 
Much contemporary scholarly literature promotes the alternative vision of 
accretionist taxation, under which the taxpayer either pays tax periodically 
on increases in his net worth, without waiting for a realization event, or 
pays upon realization an additional deferral charge, to compensate the fisc 
for the time-value of the taxes the taxpayer would have paid earlier under a 
true accretionist regime. 
70 Hasen, supra note 19, at 444. 
71 The initial value of the option would typically be set by an arm's length 
transaction. Receipt of a gratuitous or compensatory option would, however, require 
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the option is no more difficult than calculating delta, as the formula 
for both have the same dependent variables.72 Marking the option to 
market is no more difficult than performing the delta calculations that 
Hasen proposes. 
At a conceptual level, this article approaches the taxation of 
options in a manner similar to Hasen's. Delta hedging gives us a way 
to break options down into more fundamental transactions. However, 
this article accepts as a reality the fact t~at these fundamental 
transactions have clear tax treatments that are rather uncontroversial 
outside the academy. Modeling this reality - including the realization 
rule - is the goal of this article. 
3. Professor Shuldiner's Formula Interest 
The spirit of this article is most in line with the framework given 
by Professor Warren and the bifurcation models of Professors Strnad 
and Hasen. There are, however, other noteworthy proposals to reform 
the taxation of options. Professor Reed Shuldiner has proposed tax 
consequences for options based on implicit interest. Professor 
Shuldiner would impute interest income to the holder of puts and 
calls, based on the amount of premium paid. 73 Shuldiner gives the 
following example (subject to an interest rate of 10% ): 
Diva enters into a cash-settlement call option with David to 
purchase 10,000 ounces of silver in two years at $12 per 
ounce. Diva pays David $10,000 for the option .... 
Diva has purchased an asset for $10,000 which she is 
presumed to expect to increase in value to$ 11,000 by the end 
of the first year and to $12,100 by the end of the second year. 
Diva should accordingly have income of $1000 in the first 
year and $1100 in the second year.74 
Shuldiner's approach actually imputes interest income in the 
opposite direction from a delta-hedging approach. Shuldiner does not 
supply a current price of silver nor its volatility in his example. 
an initial valuation. 
72 Delta and the call price are both functions of the same variables: the risk-free 
rate, stock volatility, time to exercise, the strike price, and the market price. See 
HULL, supra note 8, at 246, 303. 
73 See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial 
Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243,308-10 (1992). 
74 See id. 
160 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 27:135 
Nevertheless, a current price of $9 per ounce and a volatility of 
26.02% are consistent with the example.75 With these parameters, 
delta is 47.84%.76 Rather than buying an option over 10,000 ounces of 
silver for $10,000, Diva could alternatively buy 4784 ounces of silver. 
The cost would be $43,056,77 which would be financed with $10,000 out 
of pocket (representing the premium) and $33,056 of debt. If we 
simply project this debt over the next two years, Diva would have year 
one interest expense of $330678 and year two interest expense of 
$3636.79 
Recall that Professor Warren had identified two basic tax regimes: 
fixed return and contingent return. Current law treats options as 
contingent-return transactions, whereas Professor Shuldiner would 
treat them as fixed-return transactions. Option theory shows that an 
option is neither fixed- nor contingent-return in its entirety. Instead, it 
is a hybrid of the two.80 
4. Proposals for Covered Calls 
Professor Calvin Johnson has argued that the premium received 
on a short call should be taxable as ordinary income if the call writer 
owns the underlying asset (i.e., writes a covered call).81 The amount of 
income would be equal to the lesser of (1) the premium received or 
(2) the unrealized appreciation in the underlying property. This 
approach relies on an accounting concept of income, focusing on the 
cash received rather than the elimination of risk in the underlying 
asset. Thus, this approach fails to reach a protective put, which an 
investor pays for, even though a protective put can eliminate risk as 
well as a covered call. Also, the approach would not reach an equity 
collar either, even though it yields a relatively certain cash return but 
at a future date. 
Professors Cunningham and Schenk would treat the sale of a 
75 In MATLAB, blsprice(9*10000, 12*10000, 0.1, 2, 0.2602) = 9999.7. 





° Cf Warren 2004, supra note 33, at 903 ("Although an actual call is subject to 
wait-and-see taxation because the return is contingent, such a synthetic call would 
produce current interest for the holder."). 
81 See Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Income from Writing Options, 73 TAX 
NOTES 203 (Oct. 14, 1996). 
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covered call as the sale of part of the underlying asset.82 Bruce Kayle 
has a similar approach. He used an example in which a taxpayer owns 
1000 shares of stock with fair market value of $100 and adjusted basis 
of $40 per share.~3 Rather than selling a covered call with a strike price 
of $100, the taxpayer might create an economically equivalent 
partnership. The partnership has two classes of ownership. Class 1 -
analogous· to the covered call - entitles the owner to all proceeds 
from the pre-established sale over $100. Class 2 - analogous to the 
retained rights - entitles the owner to all dividends until the sale, plus 
all sale proceeds up to $100 per share. In Mr. Kayle's example, the 
taxpayer sells Class 1 for $5000, retaining Class 2. Mr. Kayle concludes 
that the taxpayer would have gain of $3000 from the sale. Because 
Class 2 replicates a covered call, Mr. Kayle suggests that the covered 
call could have similar tax treatment. 
Mr. Kayle's approach would determine the taxation of the 
covered call by analogy to a more complicated transaction (classes of 
a partnership or trust). The approach of this article, in contrast, is to 
determine the taxation of options by their financial equivalence to 
more fundamental transactions (stock ownership, short selling, 
borrowing, and lending). Once a consistent system for taxing options 
is found, we could possibly invert Mr. Kayle's approach, applying the 
option-tax rules to partnership interests like Class 2. 
Finally, David Schizer has suggested an approach for dealing with 
equity collars based on the delta of a stock. Recall that an equity 
collar combines a long put with a short call and acts as a substitute for 
a short sale.84 If the spread in an equity collar is wide enough, it will 
avoid the constructive sale rules. Schizer notes that one could 
calculate the delta of the equity collar in order to determine the extent 
to which any collar should trigger the constructive sale rules.85 Schizer 
does not, however, develop this idea fully, stating "although the delta 
approach is theoretically intriguing, it is probably not practical. "86 Part 
III.B already gave a preliminary example of this approach. Part VI.D 
of this article will attempt to develop this idea more fully and will 
ultimately propose it as a way of dealing with covered calls, protective 
puts, and equity collars.87 
82 Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A 
"Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725,775-84 (1992). 
83 Kayle, supra note 33, at 273. 
84 See supra Part III.B. 
85 See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1364-67. 
86 See id. at 1367. 
87 Some commentary has argued that hedging transactions should not trigger 
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IV. THE SYNTHETIC OPTION AS A POLICY IDEAL 
A. Theoretical Case for Taxing True Options According to Synthetic 
Options 
Option theory works in financial markets because it equates 
options with liquid, easy-to-value transactions. Owning a call option is 
financially equivalent to owning a certain amount of the underlying 
stock and borrowing a certain amount of money.88 The difference in 
value between the stock ownership and the indebtedness - the equity 
in the position - should closely approximate the value of the option. 
Thus, one could say that option theory successfully bifurcates call 
options into stock and debt. The goal of this article is to apply this 
approach to the taxation of options. 
Taxing financial contracts according to their constituent parts is 
theoretically the strongest policy response to financial contract 
innovation.89 A particular strength of this bifurcation approach is its 
"continuity,"90 which ensures that small changes to a transaction do 
not result in large changes to its tax treatment. Recall the problem of 
equity collars, described in Part III.B. An equity collar is used as a 
substitute for a short sale by taxpayers. Unlike short sales, however, 
equity collars can be structured to avoid the constructive sale rules of 
section 1259. Yet at some point the spread between the call and the 
put becomes too narrow, and the constructive sale rules are engaged. 
Thus, the current-law taxation of equity collars is discontinuous. 
Bifurcating the equity collar into a short sale and bond avoids this 
discontinuity. By definition, an equity collar is a long put and short 
call, both of which can be decomposed into short selling and debt 
investing. By determining the amount of short selling inherent in the 
long put and in the short call, we can determine the extent to which 
any equity collar should trigger the constructive sale rules. Small 
changes in the equity collar would thus result in small changes in the 
realization. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment 
of Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1996). 
88 See Appendix A for detailed steps. 
89 See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 539. 
90 Professor Strnad identifies another goal - consistency. Consistency ensures 
that unique cash flows have a unique tax result. Consistency may well be satisfied 
under current-law taxation of options. It would be quite difficult for most taxpayers to 
create a synthetic option because of the necessity of frequent trading (and the 
resulting trading costs). Those taxpayers capable of creating synthetic options are 
almost certainly dealers who are subject to market-to-market taxation whether they 
hold true options or synthetic options. 
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amount of constructive sale that is triggered. 
A similar approach can be taken with the synthetic bond 
described in Part III.B. There, we saw that a bond can be created by 
buying stock, buying a put, and selling a call. This combination is 
similar to the equity collar (a long put and short call) plus stock 
ownership. As we just saw, a long put and short call are both 
combinations of short selling and lending. In this case, it is the implicit 
lending that is important. If the tax laws imputed interest income on 
this lending, then the synthetic bond would offer no tax benefits. 
Prior commentators have criticized the bifurcation approach as 
being unsound because of the lack of unique units by which 
transactions can be analyzed.91 One commentator quipped, "There are 
no fundamental individual particles such as quarks in the financial 
world."92 Yet, breaking transactions into fundamental particles is 
precisely what the Black-Scholes method does. The four fundamental 
units are owning stock, short selling stock, borrowing money, and 
lending money. Setting aside short selling for a moment, we should 
see that the tax rules for the other three transactions are familiar and 
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.93 Stock ownership gives 
rise to dividend income and gain or loss upon sale. Borrowing and 
lending money gives rise to interest expense and income. These three 
transactions are not commonly considered to be "derivatives," as we 
do not think that the economic returns on borrowing, lending, and 
stock ownership are based on other financial transactions. As for short 
selling, it is not as familiar as the other three transactions and its tax 
treatment is perhaps less stable, being radically changed in 1997.94 Yet, 
91 See Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets and Liabilities - Integration or 
Bifurcation of Financial Products, 68 TAXES 1003, 1005-07 (Dec. 1990); Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (And Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital 
Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943, 947-55 (Dec. 1989); Weisbach, supra note 11, at 512 
(citing David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt - A Mistake?, 51 
TAX NOTES 235, 237-38 (Apr. 15, 1991)). 
92 See Kau, supra note 91, at 1007 (quoted in Weisbach, supra note 11, at 512). 
93 Here, I am referring to the timing of income and deductions. The actual rate 
that applies to many of these transactions is quite volatile because of changing capital-
gains rates over the past twenty years. 
94 Cf BORIS I. BITTKER& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 57-97, 'Jl 57.8.2 n.4 (3d ed. 2000); David Schizer, Debt 
Exchangeable for Common Stock: Electivity and the Tax Treatment of Issuers and 
Holders, 1 DERIVATIVES REP. 10 (Mar. 2000); David M. Schizer, Hedging Under 
Section 1259, 80 TAX NOTES 345 (July 20, 1998); David Weisbach, Should a Short Sale 
Against the Box be a Realization Event?, 50 NAT'L TAX J . 495 (1997); Robert Willens, 
TRA '97 Closes Loopholes for Tax Deferral and Conversion of Gains Into Dividend 
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short selling should still be considered a fundamental transaction 
because it is the inverse of stock ownership. 
Thus, our fundamental particles are two pairs of inverse 
transactions: (1) borrowing and its inverse, lending, and (2) stock 
ownership and its inverse, short selling. These transactions are the 
fundamental building blocks that option theory uses to price options. 
They are also the building blocks that this article uses to examine the 
taxation of options. 
B. The Timing of Tax Items 
The total gain or loss on a synthetic option will be very close to 
the total gain or loss on a true option. After all, the whole point of the 
synthe6c call is to replicate the economic return from a true option. 
As a result, we can be sure that current law gets the amount of gain or 
loss on options right. The interesting issue is whether the timing of 
gain or loss is correct. 
Under current law, an option generates only one tax item -
either gain or loss at some realization event (e.g., upon exercise or 
expiration). Under the approach of this article, an option generates 
several tax items based upon the tax items that a synthetic option 
generates. Recall that long calls and short puts are replicated with 
stock ownership and borrowing.95 These options produce gain or loss 
from trading in the stock and interest expense from the borrowing. 
Short calls and long puts are replicated with short selling and lending. 
These options produce gain or loss from the short selling and interest 
income from the lending. 
Unlike current law, the delta-hedging approach of this article 
does not defer all tax items to some future realization event. 
Measuring the timing of these tax items requires some assumptions, 
which are summarized as follows: 
1. All tax items are taken into account immediately. So, interest 
income that is paid on October 1 is taken into account 
immediately, rather than on December 31 or April 15 of the 
following year. This assumption simplifies the calculations in 
the simulation. 
2. Characterization is disregarded. The focus is solely on the 
timing of income. This assumption may well be the most 
Income, 87 J. TAX'N 197 (1997). 
95 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
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limiting, as characterization has such a dramatic effect on tax 
rates under current law.96 
3. Deductions for losses and interest are fully useable.97 
4. Interest expense is deductible immediately, even though the 
simulation calculates interest as being capitalized.98 
5. All positions are liquidated at the expiration date. So, gain or 
loss is not deferred past the expiration date, giving us a set 
period during which to compare the timing of tax items from 
the true option and the synthetic option. 
The synthetic option produces a series of tax items over its 
lifetime. The future value of these items can be determined as of the 
expiration date. We can view this future value as the ideal measure of 
gain or loss on the option. This future value can thus be compared 
with the current-law treatment of the true option, which produces gain 
or loss only upon the exercise date. 
The ultimate goal is the accurate timing of income, subject to the 
realization requirement. Some might assert that an even more 
accurate measurement of income would come from mark-to-market 
taxation of the synthetic option.99 However, mark-to-market taxation 
96 Compare I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (applying a 15% top rate to net capital gain), 
with I.R.C. § l(i)(2) (applying a 35% top rate to ordinary income). 
97 But cf I.R.C. § 1211(b) (limiting the current deductibility of capital losses to 
capital gains plus $3000). 
9
R The interest is potentially deductible as investment interest because it is "paid 
or accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to property held for investment." 
I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A). Investment interest is deductible, subject to two caveats worthy 
of note. First, the deduction cannot exceed an individual taxpayer's "net investment 
income." See I.R.C. § 163(d)(1). We can comfortably assume that the taxpayer has 
sufficient investment income to allow for a full interest deduction. After all, well-to-
do taxpayers are the ones most likely to buy equity options. Second, and more 
significantly, a cash-basis taxpayer must pay the interest in cash before he can take a 
deduction. See Davison v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 35 (1996), affd 141 F.3d 403 (2d 
Cir. 1998). We could assume that our investor pays this interest out of his own funds. 
This assumption would give our synthetic option a different cash flow from the true 
option, which requires no interim payments. Or, our investor might switch his method 
of accounting to the accrual method. Again, however, the true option does not 
mandate this switch. Finally, and perhaps most consistent with the simulation, we can 
assume that the investor borrows money from a new lender at the end of each year to 
pay the year's interest expense. 
99 C.f, e.g., MichaelS. Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1996); John Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NOTES 
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of the synthetic option 1s the same as mark-to-market taxation of the 
option itself,100 because the economic value of the synthetic option 
should track the economic value of the true option. Because the 
realization rule is so firmly entrenched, this article does not consider a 
mark-to-market system for taxing options. 
The simulation must measure the timing of two types of tax items: 
(1) interest expense or income and (2) gain or loss from trading. 
Measuring the timing of interest is computationally straightforward. 
Recall for example that a synthetic long call is created by the purchase 
of delta shares of stock, financed in part by borrowing. We can assume 
that the borrowing generates interest at the same rate used in the 
Black-Scholes formula. Measuring the gain or loss from trading is 
more difficult. As time passes and the stock price fluctuates, the 
investor would need to rebalance the debt/stock portfolio. The goal is 
always to have the number of shares owned equal delta. When delta 
falls, for example, the investor would need to sell some stock, 
generating gain or loss on the sale. Measuring this gain or loss requires 
us to adopt some system of inventory accounting, discussed using an 
example in the next section. 
C. A Simple Simulation 
Recall the ABC stock example used above, drawn from Professor 
Hasen's article: 
ABC stock is worth $30 on Day 1 and has moderate volatility 
of 30%. On Day 1, when the risk-free rate of interest is 10%, 
B sells A an option to buy ABC stock at $33 on Day 2, one 
year later. The price of the option is $3.64. At all times from 
Day 1 to Day 2 B is the record owner of the ABC stock. ABC 
k d. 'd d 101 stoc pays no 1v1 en s. 
Let us assume that an investor wants to replicate this call option, but 
over 10,000 shares. The call option has an initial value of $36,393 and 
an initial delta of 56.58%. So, the investor must initially buy 5658 
shares, at a total cost of $169,740. The investor pays for this purchase 
with $36,393, borrowing the balance of $133,347. 
1399 (June 7, 1993) (proposing mandatory passthrough of income or loss as to private 
C corporations and mark-to-market accrual taxation of shareholders of public C 
corporations). 
100 See supra notes 70--72 and accompanying text. 
101 Hasen, supra note 19, at 438-39. 
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Hasen's example has the stock at $35.08 six months later. To 
demonstrate how the synthetic option should work, I gen~rated a 
series of random walks that the stock could take, and captured the 
first that ended at $35.08. I assumed that each step was one week long. 
At each step, I calculated delta and rebalanced the debt/stock 
mixture. New purchases of stock are financed with new borrowing. 
Sales of stock produce cash that reduces previous borrowing. The 
results are summarized as follows: 
Option 
Beginning Value $ 36,393 
Shares 10,000 
Shares Borrowed Cumulative 
Week Stock Delta Bought Cost Interest Cost 
0 $ 30.00 0.5658 5658 133,347 0 133,347 
1 30.31 0.5763 105 3183 256 136,786 
2 31.50 0.6239 476 14,994 263 152,043 
3 32.33 0.6550 311 10,055 292 162,390 
4 34.16 0.7205 655 22,375 312 185,077 
5 36.07 0.7798 593 21,390 356 206,823 
6 36.71 0.7973 175 6424 398 213,645 
7 36.56 0.7930 (43) (1572) 411 212,483 
8 35.62 0.7647 (283) (10,080) 409 202,811 
9 38.09 0.8328 681 25,939 390 229,141 
10 39.78 0.8702 374 14,878 441 244,459 
ll 36.39 0.7871 (831) (30,240) 470 214,689 
12 36.92 0.8025 154 5686 413 220,788 
13 33.59 0.6868 (1157) (38,864) 425 182,349 
14 34.21 0.7101 233 7971 351 190,670 
15 35.93 0.7715 614 22,061 367 213,098 
16 37.60 0.8225 510 19,176 410 232,684 
17 40.38 0.8881 656 26,489 447 259,621 
18 39.50 0.8712 (169) (6676) 499 253,444 
19 41.04 0.9027 315 12,928 487 266,859 
20 40.33 0.8909 (118) (4759) 513 262,614 
21 38.74 0.8567 (342) (13,249) 505 249,870 
22 37.42 0.8209 (358) (13,396) 481 236,954 
23 36.94 0.8063 (146) (5393) 456 232,016 
24 36.50 0.7918 (145) (5293) 446 227,170 
25 34.81 0.7242 (676) (23,532) 437 204,075 
26 35.08 0.7356 114 3999 392 208,467 
Total 197,840 10,627 
True 
EndinJ;?; !Option $ 50,268 
Synthetic 
!Option $ 49,581 
The ending value of the synthetic option is the value of the owned 
stock (7356 shares at $35.08 per share, or $258,048) minus the 
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cumulative borrowing and interest ($208,467). Thus, the synthetic 
option is worth $49,581, fairly close to the Black-Scholes value of 
$50,268. The results would be even closer using daily, rather than 
weekly, rebalancing. 
The synthetic option produces interest expense of $10,627 in the 
current year, and the timing of this interest is obvious from the 
spreadsheet. However, there was also buying and selling of stock. The 
buying has no direct tax consequences, but the selling produces 
taxable gain or loss, the measurement of which is not obvious. Perhaps 
the most realistic approach to measuring the gains and losses from 
trading would be to assume strategic behavior by the investor. The 
investor would select the particular stocks to sell so as to minimize 
gains and maximize losses, subject to the wash-sale rules. Strategic 
trading is allowed by Treasury regulations,102 subject to the wash-sale 
rules (discussed below). 
Ultimately however I chose not to present such a simulation. One 
reason is complexity. Strategic trading assumes that the taxpayer 
maintains an inventory of stock, purchased on different dates, with 
each having a unique adjusted basis.103 Modeling strategic trading 
leads to complex, less readable computer code. Another reason for 
not presenting the model with strategic trading is the lack of symmetry 
between short and long positions. If the investor is assumed to trade 
strategically, then we can expect the investor to trade differently 
depending on whether he is replicating for example a long call or a 
short call. So, the taxable gain produced by a long call may be 
different from the taxable loss produced by the short call. 
The simulation I prepared uses a weighted-average-cost basis. At 
any particular time, each share held by the investor has the same 
adjusted basis, which equals the average cost of the prior purchases. 
This approach simplifies the programming code, because only one 
adjusted basis is needed at any time. Moreover, if the realization rule 
is taken as a constraint, a weighted-average-cost approach is arguably 
the best measure of income.104 The stock or short sales that constitute 
the synthetic are fungible. Selling one versus another does not affect 
102 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) (as amended in 1996). 
103 I actually did prepare a simulation that models strategic trading, subject to the 
wash-sale rules, and the resulting programming code is rather lengthy and abstruse. 
104 Cf. Simon D. Ulcickas, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 1259: A 
Legitimate Foundation for Taxing Short Sales Against the Box or a Mere Makeover? , 
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1355, 1368 n.86 (1998) (citing DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY, 1996 GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE 
PROPOSALS 70-71 (1996)). 
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the pre-tax returns enjoyed by the taxpayer. Although there are other 
plausible methods of inventory accounting for the securities,105 only 
the weighted-average-cost method is presented in this article. 
The weighted-average-cost method is not allowed by current law, 
although it was proposed by the Clinton administration.106 Another 
deviation from current law in this simulation is the absence of wash-
sale rules. The wash-sale rules potentially disallow a loss on the sale of 
stock if either (1) the taxpayer retains other shares of the same stock 
purchased thirty days before the date of sale or (2) the taxpayer buys 
other shares of the same stock thirty days after the date of sale.107 The 
purpose of the wash-sale rules is to restrain strategic trading that 
could realize losses and defer gains. 108 Under the weighted-average-
cost simulation however there is no possibility for strategic behavior. 
The timing of trades is determined solely by movements in delta, and 
the weighted-average-cost method thwarts the taxpayer's ability to 
select high-basis stock to sell. In short, using a weighted-average-cost 
method and eliminating the wash-sale rules represent a simplifying 
compromise that reflects economic income while retaining the 
realization rule. 
Let us return to the prior example, recalling that the option 
produced an interest expense of $10,627 in the first taxable year. Now 
that we have an inventory method, we can calculate the gain or loss on 
the sales that the movement in delta forces. That reckoning is as 
follows: 
105 Perhaps the best candidate is the "first-in-first-out" method allowed by Treas. 
Reg.§ 1.1012-1(c)(1). Treas. Reg.§ 1.1012-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1996). 
106 See Ulcickas, supra note 104. 
107 See I.R.C. § 1091. 
108 See David Schizer, Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules, 82 TAXES 67, 67 (Mar. 
2004) ("[Without limitations on losses] the 'timing option' inherent in the realization 
rule would allow taxpayers to defer gains (thereby reducing the tax's present value) 
while accelerating losses (thereby preserving the deduction's present value)."). 
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Beginning Option $ 36,393 
Shares 10,000 
Shares Shares Realized Deferred 
Week Stock Needed Bought WAC GIL GIL 
0 $ 30.00 5658 5658 $ 30.00 
I 30.31 5763 105 30.01 
2 31.50 6239 476 30.12 
3 32.33 6550 311 30.22 
4 34.16 7205 655 30.58 
5 36.07 7798 593 31.00 
6 36.71 7973 175 31.13 
7 36.56 7930 (43) 31.13 234 
8 35.62 7647 (283) 31.13 1272 
9 38.09 8328 681 31.69 
10 39.78 8702 374 32.04 
11 36.39 7871 (831) 32.04 3613 
12 36.92 8025 154 32.14 
13 33.59 6868 (1157) 32.14 1683 
14 34.21 7101 233 32.20 
15 35.93 7715 614 32.50 
16 37.60 8225 510 32.82 
17 40.38 8881 656 33.38 
18 39.50 8712 (169) 33.38 1035 
19 41.04 9027 315 33.64 
20 40.33 8909 (118) 33.64 789 
21 38.74 8567 (342) 33.64 1743 
22 37.42 8209 (358) 33.64 1352 
23 36.94 8063 (146) 33.64 481 
24 36.50 7918 (145) 33.64 414 
25 34.81 7242 (676) 33.64 789 
26 35.08 7356 114 33.66 10,409 
Total $13,406 $10,409 
Under the weighted-average-cost approach, the synthetic option 
produces taxable gain of $13,406. Recall that it also produces interest 
expense of $10,627. Therefore, the net realized income is $2779. 
However, the investor has not sold all the stock holdings, which still 
have $10,409 of unrealized appreciation. If we take the synthetic call 
to be our normative baseline, then the true call appears to be 
undertaxed. All of the gain of the true call is deferred, whereas $2779 
2007] Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo 171 
of the gain on the synthetic call is realized currently.109 The following 
table summarizes the findings of this small simulation, comparing the 
results of the synthetic call with those of the true call: 
Item Synthetic Call True Call 
Initial Investment $36,393 $36,393 
Deferred Gain $10,409 $13,875 
Realized Gain $13,406 -0-
Interest Expense ($10,627) -0-
Net Realized Income $2779 -0-
Total Value $49,581 $50,268 
This example will hopefully illustrate the potential problem of 
option tax under current law - deferral of taxable gain. Nevertheless, 
we should be cautious about inferring too much from it too quickly. 
First, this example is just one path the stock can take, and it happened 
to be a winning path. We have yet to examine what happens with 
other paths, on which the stock might decline. Second, even though 
this example showed that the synthetic-option would produce income 
of $2779, this amount is deferred only for a year. It is not forgiven. 
Third, and finally, the $2779 (or 28¢ per share covered by the options) 
is only a portion (about 1/5) of the total economic gain on the 
synthetic call. By way of comparison, a comprehensive mark-to-
market regime actually performs far worse than does current law in 
achieving the synthetic-call ideal.110 
One asset path, over the course of six months, does not yield 
enough insights into the gain and loss from trading and the interest 
expense or deductions. Although we have a framework for examining 
the consequences of deferral, we now need to apply it over many 
different scenarios and over a greater period of time. Accomplishing 
this task is the goal of the next section. 
109 Remember that the option covers 10,000 shares, so a synthetic option covering 
one share would have realized gain of about 28¢. 
110 Professor Hasen's "quasi-mark-to-market" system would yield short-term 
capital gain of $33,100. This is far greater than the $2779 presented in my example or 
even the $13,875 that a mark-to-market system would produce. 
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V. TAXING THE NAKED OPTION: A MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION 
A. Introduction 
The goal of this section is to compare the consequences of taxing 
options under the synthetic-option ideal described in the prior section 
with the consequences of taxing options under the deferral method of 
current law. This section will focus on naked options - i.e., options 
that are not coupled with a position in the underlying asset. 111 The next 
section will focus on covered calls and protective puts - short calls 
and long puts combined with the underlying stock.112 The naked 
options are analyzed first because they do not implicate the 
constructive sale rules of section 1259. 
This section will ask whether current law inappropriately defers 
the tax consequences of options. To do so, this section will compare 
two types of transactions. The first is the taxation of an actual option 
under current law, assuming that the option is settled in cash at the 
expiration date. Current law defers the tax consequences of this 
transaction until the expiration date (assuming cash settlement). The 
second type is a hypothetical synthetic option created by an investor. 
The synthetic option is created by delta hedging with daily 
rebalancing. Thus, every day will potentially generate gain or loss and 
interest expense or income. As with the true option we will assume 
that the synthetic-option position is liquidated at the expiration date. 
The total gain or loss will be roughly the same between the two 
transactions. What is different is the timing. The synthetic option will 
produce a series of tax items: interest expense and income and trading 
gains and losses. The future value of these tax items will be projected 
forward to the exercise date. This future value can then be compared 
with the tax consequences on the true option (which exist only at the 
111 Cf Campbell Harvey, Futures and Options Glossary, http://www.duke.edu/-
charvey/Classes/glossary/g_n.htm (last visited May 9, 2007). Professor Harvey's 
glossary of finance terms defines naked strategies as: 
!d. 
An unhedged strategy making exclusive use of one of the following: long 
call strategy (buying call options), short call strategy (selling or writing call 
options), long put strategy (buying put options), and short put strategy 
(selling or writing put options). By themselves, these positions are called 
naked strategies because they do not involve an offsetting or risk-reducing 
position in another option or the underlying security. 
112 See id. at http://www.duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/glossary/g_c.htm, http://www. 
duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/glossary/g_p.htm. 
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exercise date under current law). 
I wrote a computer simulation to compare the taxation of 
synthetic options with the current-law taxation of true options. One 
might ask why taxation of the synthetic option needs to be measured 
by computer simulation. After all, the price of an option can be 
derived directly from the Black-Scholes formula, which itself is based 
on a synthetic option. Unfortunately, a direct solution to the taxation 
of the synthetic option is unavailable because the tax consequences of 
a synthetic option depend upon the path the stock takes. The goal of 
this article however is to examine the taxation of options held or 
written by individual investors on the cash method of accounting. 
Unlike dealers,113 investors will be subject to the realization 
requirement, which greatly complicates the analysis. For example, a 
decline in delta might prompt our investor to sell stock. The gain or 
loss on the sale is determined by the cost of stock previously 
purchased, which depends in turn on the history of stock prices. Such 
"path dependent" results can be estimated only by a computer 
simulation. 114 
The calculation will be performed using a so-called Monte-Carlo 
simulation that I wrote in the MA TLAB computer language. The 
computer generated 2000 pseudo-random walks for the stock to take 
over the course of five years. Each pseudo-random walk is 1800 steps 
long, corresponding with daily price movements measured over five 
years. A random number generator determines the daily movement of 
stock, using the standard assumption of Brownian motion.115 The 
113 Dealers would be subject to mark-to-market taxatio~ under I.R.C. § 475. 
I.R.C. § 475. See generally David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1549, 1586--87 (1998); Dana L. Trier, Rethinking the Taxation of Nonqualified 
Deferred Compensation: Code Sec. 409A, the Hedging Regulations and Code Sec. 
1032. , 84 TAXES 141, 168 (2006). 
114 See HULL, supra note 8, at 462. Some commentators are uncomfortable with 
path dependent tax results. See Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal 
Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 859, 
883-85 (2002). 
115 See BRANDIMARTE, supra note 30, at 316. Professor Strnad describes 
Brownian motion as follows: 
Geometric Brownian motion means that the rate of return is a constant 
plus a Brownian motion term. A constant rate of return would imply a 
smooth, geometrically increasing asset value path. . . . The Brownian 
motion term adds a rapidly fluctuating deviation with mean zero to the 
constant rate of return. Brownian motion is named after Robert Brown 
who observed and described the jerky and random motion of pollen 
particles suspended in liquid in 1827-28. Geometric Brownian motion is the 
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simulation calculates delta and the components of the synthetic option 
on a daily basis. Also, the simulation records the tax items associated 
with each day (interest expense or income; gain or loss from trading). 
The future value of these tax items is taken for each pseudo-random 
walk. As we have 2000 pseudo-random walks, the mean of the results 
is reported. 
The conclusion of this section is that current law may well be the 
best practical system for taxing naked options, although it does 
deviate from the synthetic-option ideal. Even though the synthetic 
option generates daily gains and losses from trading, they often offset 
each other. What current law fails to capture is the interest expense 
and income associated with synthetic options. Ultimately, this section 
concludes that ignoring this interest component is the best approach 
for the tax system. 
B. The Hypothetical Stock and Options 
This section uses one hypothetical stock on XYZ Corp. We will 
assume that XYZ Corp. stock pays no dividends, and that the 
standard deviation of its return is 25%. Its current market price is $50 
per share. Let us also assume the current risk-free rate of interest is 
5% for all periods. 
As for the options, let us assume that the exercise price is $50 and 
the term of the option is five years long. We now have all of the 
information we need to value the options and calculate delta using the 
Black-Scholes pricing formula. 
Current price: S = $50 
Strike price: K = $50 
Interest rate: r = 5% 
Time to exercise: T = 5 
Volatility: = 25% 
usual assumption in theoretical finance models of common stock prices. 
Recent empirical evidence casts some doubt on the accuracy of the 
geometric Brownian motion assumption, but it is hard to come up with an 
obvious alternative candidate for theoretical work. 
Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1817, 1870 n.149 (1990) (citations omitted). 
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The formulas return the following initial amounts: 
Price of call: c = $16.25 116 
Price of put: p = $5.19117 
Delta of call: ~c= 76.63% 118 
Delta of put: ~P= -23.37%.119 
These results allow us to initiate the synthetic options as follows: 
Synthetic Call Option: 
• Buy ~c= 0.7663 shares of XYZ stock for $38.32. 
• Finance this purchase in part with an out-of-pocket 
contribution of c = $16.25. 
• The remainder, $22.07, comes from borrowing!20 
Synthetic Put Option: 
• Sell short -~P= 0.2337 of XYZ stock for proceeds of $11.68. 
• Invest these proceeds, plus an additional p = $5.19 out of 
pocket, in a debt instrument. 
• The total investment in the debt instrument is thus 
$16.87. 121 
We can garner some immediate insights into the expected 
taxation of the true options based on the Black-Scholes method. For 
technical reasons beyond the scope of this article, cash flows are 
call. 
put. 
116 In MATLAB, blsprice(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25) returns a value of $16.2520 for the 
117 In MATLAB, blsprice(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25) returns a value of $5.1920 for the 
ns This is the call delta derived in MATLAB from blsdelta(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25). 
n
9 This is the put delta derived in MATLAB from blsdelta(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25). 
120 A short call would be initiated in inverse fashion. Sell short llc= 0.7663 shares 
of XYZ stock for proceeds of $38.32. Place c = $16.25 "in pocket" (representing the 
premium received by a call writer). The remainder, $22.07, is invested in a debt 
instrument. 
121 A short put would be initiated in inverse fashion. Buy -llp= 0.2337 of XYZ 
stock for $11.68. Borrow funds to pay for this, plus an additional p = $5.19 
(representing the premium received by a put writer) for a total indebtedness of 
$16.87. 
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valued at risk-free rates under the Black-Scholes model. 122 As a result, 
we can easily arrive at expected values of the option contracts at the 
end of five years. The call option is expected to be worth $20.87,123 and 
the put option is expected to be worth $6.67.124 So, if the options are all 
settled in cash, there will be a realization event in five years. At that 
time, the taxpayer will have an expected on the call of $4.62 and on 
the put of $1.47. 
The synthetic option should produce almost the same amount of 
total gain or loss. After all, the whole point of a synthetic option is to 
replicate the economic gain or loss from a true option. The key issue, 
which is being measured by the simulation, is whether the true option 
results in more or less tax deferral than a synthetic option. Finding the 
"typical" tax treatment of these synthetic options is impractical 
without a computer simulation. Even though the final value of the 
stock determines the option payoff, it does not determine the interim 
tax treatment. We must also know what path the stock took in 
reaching its final value. These movements in the stock will determine 
interim gains, losses, interest income, and interest expense. 
As noted before, I estimated the timing of tax items associated 
with synthetic options using a Monte-Carlo simulation written in the 
MATLAB programming language. The simulation recalculates delta 
and uses the new delta to rebalance the synthetic option on a daily 
basis. 
The synthetic call option has the following tax items. It will 
produce interest expense on a daily basis, but will never produce 
interest income. It will also produce gain or loss whenever stock is 
required to be sold (i.e., when delta declinesr25 On days when the 
stock is purchased (i.e., when delta rises), no gain or loss is realized. 
The synthetic put option has the following tax items. It will 
produce interest income on a daily basis, but will never produce 
interest expense. It will produce gain or loss whenever short sales are 
closed (i.e., when the absolute value of delta declines). 126 On days 
122 Readers with a little finance should resist the temptation of determining 
expected option payoffs using expected stock values. Because of risk-free pricing, the 
expected return on the stock is actually irrelevant. All that matters is the volatility of 
the stock. See HULL, supra note 8, at 245. 
123 $16.25*e"(0.05*5). 
12~ $5.19*e"(0.05*5). 
125 For a discussion of the weighted-average cost method used to calculate gain or 
loss, see supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. 
126 For a discussion of the weighted-average cost method used to calculate gain or 
loss, see supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. 
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when short sales are initiated (i.e., when the absolute value of delta 
rises), no gain or loss is realized. 
The simulation will thus generate a series of daily tax items 
associated with the synthetic option. We can compare this series to the 
gain or loss on the true option by taking the future value of the series. 
I did not prepare express simulations for the short call and the short 
put. Because the simulations do not allow for any strategic trading, the 
results for the short positions should be the exact inverse of the 
simulated long positions. 
C. Results of Simulation 
To recap, the synthetic call option will produce interest expense 
plus gain or loss from stock trading, and the synthetic put will produce 
interest income plus gain or loss from short selling. This section 
reports the results of the simulation of a synthetic call and a synthetic 
put. In this simulation, we assume that the initial stock price is $50, the 
strike price is $50, the risk-free rate is 5%, the time to exercise is five 
years, and the volatility of the stock is 25%. The stock bears no 
dividends, and the options are European. 
We assume that the stock moves once per day according to the 
standard random-walk model. Thus, 1800 steps follow the first day. At 
each step, the synthetic option is rebalanced to reflect the change in 
stock price. This process is repeated 2000 times. Thus, the computer 
simulation rebalances a hedging portfolio 7.2 million times (3.6 million 
times for each option). The following tables show how effective delta 
hedging is at simulating and bifurcating the true option. 
Bifurcation of Call Option -
Sum (Not Future Value) of Tax Items 
Mean Interest Expense on ($6.28) 
S_ynthetic Call 
Mean Net Gain from Stock $10.54 
Trading on Synthetic Call 
Mean Difference between ($0.00) 
Synthetic and True Call 
Mean Gain on True Call $4.26 
(Sum of Above) 
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Bifurcation of Put Option -
Sum (Not Future Value) of Tax Items 
Mean Interest Income on $4.79 
Synthetic Put 
Mean Net Loss from Short ($3.37) 
Selling_ on Synthetic Put 
Mean Difference between ($0.01) 
Synthetic and True Put 
Mean Gain on True Put $1.41 
(Sum of Above) 
These results merely confirm that delta hedging closely replicates 
the returns on options and that it is possible to bifurcate the option 
gain into more fundamental units - interest and trading gain or loss. 
The ultimate goal of the simulation is to examine the timing of 
current-law taxation of options under a realization system. To probe 
this question, I calculated the future value of the trading items (gains 
and losses) and the future value of the interest items (income or 
expense). These tax items are measured at the time they accrue by the 
MATLAB simulation, and then projected forward to the expiration 
date using the assumed discount rate of 5%. The future-value 
calculations are listed below: 
Analysis of Call Option 
Measured Over 2000 Simulations 
Tax Items Mean of Mean of Sum Difference 
from Future Value (Current-Law (Current Law 
Synthetic Call (Tax-Policy Deferral) Less Ideal) 
Ideal)_ 
Interest 
Expense ($7.08) ($6.27) $0.81 
Net Gain 
from Stock 
Trading $10.23 $10.54 $0.31 
TOTAL $3.15 $4.27 $1.12 
So, the ideal measure of expected income at the expiration of the 
option is about $3.15, but the expected income under current law is 
about $4.27. Current law thus appears to overtax the holders of call 
options. Most of this over-taxation comes from the failure to grant the 
call holder any interest deduction while the call is outstanding. We can 
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invert the results to see that current law appears to undertax the 
writers of call options, as it does not impute interest income during the 
life of the call option. 
Analysis of Put Option 
Measured Over 2000 Simulations 
Tax Items Mean of Mean of Sum Difference 
from Future Value (Current-Law (Current Law 
Synthetic Put (Tax-Policy Deferral) Less Ideal) 
Ideal) 
Interest $5.42 $4.79 ($0.63) 
Income 
Net Loss from ($3.95) ($3.37) $0.58 
Short Selling 
TOTAL $1.47 $1.42 ($0.05) 
Current law taxes the put at very close to the right amount. By 
committing two theoretical wrongs, current law arrives at practically 
the right result for the put. Current law overtaxes the gains and losses 
from short trading, but undertaxes the interest income associated with 
the put. These two failures appear to cancel each other out. At least 
on average, the taxation of the true put and synthetic put are 
remarkably close. 
D. Interpretation 
The results given above are consistent with a more qualitative 
explanation of delta hedging. Under this qualitative explanation, 
current law is about right in its taxation of put options (both long and 
short). In contrast, current law overtaxes long calls and undertaxes 
short calls. 
Consider, for example, the long call. Current law defers all gain or 
loss to some future realization event (e.g., exercise or expiration). 
Since the long call is bifurcated into stock ownership and debt, the 
synthetic long call produces interest expense over its life. The 
synthetic long call will also tend to produce more realized losses than 
gains before the end of the option. To see why, recall that the goal 
with delta hedging is always to own a number of shares equal to delta. 
Now, if stock prices go up, then mathematically delta will also go up. 127 
127 The sensitivity of delta to stock prices is given by gamma, which is always 
positive. See HULL, supra note 8, at 314. 
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The rising delta, in turn, forces the investor to buy more shares. The 
rising market produces gains, but they are deferred because the 
investor is not selling. In contrast, falling stock prices cause a falling 
delta, which forces the synthetic-long-call investor to sell shares. So, 
the losses associated with this falling market tend to be realized. 
Under this qualitative theory of synthetic long calls, losses tend to 
be realized whereas gains tend to be deferred. Moreover, the synthetic 
option produces interest deductions throughout its life. In contrast, 
current law defers the recognition of all tax items associated with the 
option. Because the holder of the call must wait to take advantage of 
the losses and expenses produced by the synthetic counterpart, 
current law overtaxes the long call. The inverse will hold for the short 
call (interest income plus realized gains and deferred losses). Similar 
analysis for puts is left to a footnote,128 and the entire results are 
summarized below. 
Type of Current Law 
Synthetic Trading Trading Treatment of 
Option Gains Losses Interest True Ogtion 
Long Call Deferred Realized Expense Overtaxes 
Short Realized Deferred Income Undertaxes Call 
Long Put Deferred Realized Income Correct or 
ambiguous 
Short Put Realized Deferred Expense Correct or 
ambiguous 
This analysis shows that the Monte-Carlo simulation of the prior 
Part V.C is consistent with the dynamics of synthetic options. Thus, 
we can be sure that current law is not a perfect representation of the 
ideal. Yet, as the next section will argue, it may be as close to the ideal 
as we can practically achieve. 
128 A synthetic long put will produce interest income over its life. When stock 
prices rise, delta rises as well. Since delta for a put is negative, the rising delta (e.g., 
from -0.4 to -0.3) means that short sales must be closed. As short sales do poorly in a 
rising market, this means that losses are realized. In contrast, a falling market in the 
stock means that delta falls as well (e.g., from -0.4 to -0.5). This means that more short 
sales need to be executed, triggering no gain or loss. As short sales do well in a falling 
market, this means that gains are deferred. In summary, a synthetic long put produces 
interest income, defers gains, and triggers losses. A synthetic short put is the opposite 
(interest expense, realized gain, and deferred losses). 
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E. Policy Implications 
Can the tax laws improve the taxation of naked options, using 
synthetic options as the policy ideal? The answer is probably not, as 
current law achieves results close to the ideal. Synthetic options 
produce two types of tax items: (1) gain or loss from trading and (2) 
interest income or expense. Option taxation could theoretically be 
improved by imputing income or expense based on these items before 
the expiration of the option. Doing so would result in great practical 
difficulties and only modest improvements. 
Imputing the gain or loss from trading is administratively 
infeasible, even if theoretically possible. In order to determine the 
gain or loss from trading, a taxpayer would have to create a 
bookkeeping account to reflect the equity and debt position 
associated with the synthetic option. The account would then need to 
be updated frequently - probably daily - to reflect the passage of 
time and changes in the stock price. Despite its theoretical appeal, this 
approach is far too cumbersome and burdensome to use for taxing 
real-world options. 
Imputing interest may be administratively feasible. Yet, merely 
imputing interest would actually worsen the taxation of put options. 
Recall that the interest income and trading losses on the synthetic 
long put offset each other almost completely in the Monte-Carlo 
simulation.129 By failing to recognize either, the results under current 
law may do a good job of reflecting the synthetic-option ideal. 
Imputing only the interest would destroy this balance. 
Imputing interest to calls may improve the performance of option 
taxation even without imputing trading gains or losses. Recall that 
that the long call produced interest expense and trading losses.130 
Recognizing only the interest expense would mitigate the 
shortcomings of current law. 
It is not difficult to estimate the expected interest on a call option. 
Recall that our synthetic long call is initiated as follows: Buy ·\= 
0.7663 shares of XYZ stock for $38.32, and finance this purchase with 
an out-of-pocket contribution of $16.25 (which is the option value). 
The remainder, $22.07, comes from borrowing.131 We could assume 
129 See supra Part V.C. 
130 See id. 
131 Put: Sell short -L\= 0.2337 of XYZ stock for proceeds of $11.68. Invest this 
amount, plus an additional p = $5.19 in a debt instrument (for a total investment of 
$16.87). 
182 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 27:135 
that the taxpayer actually does create this initial position when buying 
an option, but never changes it over the life of the option. Using the 
same 5% rate used to price the options, we see that the hypothetical 
interest should come to $6.2i32 - a result that is almost exactly the 
same as reported for the Monte-Carlo simulation reported above. We 
should assume that the interest accumulates on a daily basis. 
Projecting that daily interest forward to future value yields about 
$7.08 - again, very close to the same as for the Monte-Carlo 
simulation reported above. 
This system is, however, counterintuitive. Even though the buyer 
of a call expects to gain from the transaction, the system imputes a 
deduction until a realization event occurs. The inverse is true for a call 
writer, who pays money for a call yet faces imputed interest income. 
Professor Shuldiner's system of imputing interest is more intuitive and 
typical, as it imputes interest income, not expense, to the call holder. 
Greater consistency with the synthetic-call ideal clashes with tax 
aesthetics. 
Even if the strangeness of imputing interest according to the 
synthetic call does not deter us, some practical considerations may. 
Granting an interest deduction to a cash-method call holder may not 
even be consistent with the proper taxation of the synthetic call.133 A 
synthetic-call holder might face serious difficulties in achieving an 
interest deduction before expiration under the cash method. Granting 
interest deductions to call holders may also open the door to tax 
avoidance134 unless the deduction is subject to complex systems like 
the straddle and wash-sale rules.135 Moreover, current law may 
approximate the overall, correct result by denying call holders any 
interest deductions while excusing call writers from any interest 
m $22.07*((e"(.05*5))-1). 
133 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
134 Cf David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive 
Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1388-89 (2000) (noting that reforms can 
possibly open the door to new tax planning opportunities). 
135 For example, suppose that a taxpayer buys and writes the same call option, 
creating a perfectly neutral position. The long call produces an interest deduction, and 
the short call produces interest income. Suppose that the stock price falls. The fall 
pushes delta down, which decreases the amount of debt implicit in either side of the 
contract. The taxpayer might like to sell the long call, which is now producing an 
interest expense greater than that implied by the current synthetic option. 
Contemporaneously, the taxpayer might repurchase another, identical long call. The 
wash-sale and straddle rules would independently deny a loss deduction here. But 
some similar mechanism would be needed to prevent the taxpayer from refreshing the 
imputed interest on only one side of the straddle. 
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income. If call holders and writers have the same marginal tax rate on 
average, then current law reaches the same result as the synthetic-
option approach. 
Thus, taxing the interest implicit in an option may be both 
difficult and of limited ultimate value. More limited reforms may be 
feasible. Although section 1258 imposes ordinary-income treatment 
on a synthetic bond created by a combination of stock, a long put, and 
a short call, section 1258 does not alter the timing of the income from 
the synthetic bond. 136 Even though section 1258 treats the synthetic 
bond as a bond for characterization, timing of the income is still 
determined under the realization standard. This analysis shows why 
section 1258 should also impute the interest income on an annual 
basis. 
F. Conclusion 
In Part IV above, I argued that a synthetic option is the 
theoretical ideal for taxing equity options. This section attempts to 
implement this ideal, focusing on naked options. Because the taxation 
of synthetic options depends on the actual path that the stock price 
takes, synthetic-option taxation can be measured only with a 
computer simulation. According to the simulation, current law 
appears to tax put options (long and short) correctly. However, 
current law appears to overtax long calls and undertax short calls. 
These results are consistent with a qualitative account of the tax items 
associated with synthetic options. 
Yet, achieving the perfect result for a call option is probably not 
feasible. Although synthetic options produce gains and losses from 
trading, imputing these tax items to true options is not feasible. 
Synthetic options also produce interest income and expense. Imputing 
such items to call options is feasible but ultimately unwise. Interest 
expense would be imputed to the long call, but allowing a deduction 
for this expense may present opportunities for abuse. Imputing 
interest income to short calls would not lead to such opportunities. 
Imputing interest income to options would destroy the current 
136 BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 94, <J[ 57.8.3 ("Section 1258 affects only 
characterization. Timing is not affected. Interest income is generally recognized as it 
accrues, but gains and losses on the positions making up a conversion transaction are 
recognized only when realized by a sale, exchange, or termination of those 
positions."); DAVID M. SCHIZER, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: SPECIAL RULES <J[ II.A. 
(2005) ("Notably, though, this measure [§ 1258] does not accelerate the timing of this 
income."). 
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symmetry between short and long positions in the same option. 
Overall, the system for taxing options may work well, even though 
short calls are undertaxed and long calls are overtaxed. 
The taxation of short calls and long puts will be examined again in 
the next section. There, the options are combined with a position in 
the underlying stock. The result - covered calls and protective puts 
- would ideally trigger the recognition of unrealized gain in the 
underlying stock itself. 
VI. TAXING THE COVERED CALL AND PROTECTIVE PUT: A MONTE-
CARLO SIMULATION 
A. Covered Calls and Protective Puts 
A covered call is a short call combined with ownership of the 
underlying asset. Because the writer of the call receives premium 
income, prior commentators and courts have struggled with the issue 
of whether the writer should be treated as having sold the underlying 
asset. Current law answers with a definitive "no." This section will 
show that covered calls are best analyzed as implicit short sales. It will 
then extend this analysis to protective puts (long puts combined with 
ownership of the underlying asset). Under this approach, the taxation 
of covered calls and protective puts depends on the delta of the 
position, rather than the amount of premium income received. 
To illustrate the problem of covered calls, suppose that Maya 
owns 10,000 shares of ABC stock. She has a $0 per-share basis in the 
stock, which is currently worth $30 per share. Next, suppose that 
Maya sells call options on the stock, exercisable in one year at $33 per 
share. Maya will receive cash for writing the call, perhaps $36,393 
($3.6393 per share) if we use the assumptions from above.137 The 
problem arises in determining whether tax law should treat Maya as 
having sold the stock when she writes the call on it. 
Under current law, Maya would pay no tax for writing this call. 138 
The explanation for this treatment is that the short call and the stock 
are separate transactions, although the historical basis for this 
treatment comes from abstruse reasoning involving the character of 
137 See supra text accompanying note 59 (assuming price of $30, strike price of 
$33, risk-free rate of 10%, expiration in one year, volatility of 30%, and no dividends). 
In MATLAB, blsprice(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a price of 3.6393 for the call. In 
MA TLAB, blsdelta(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a delta of 0.5658 for the call. 
138 See BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 94, 'II 57.3.1. 
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the premium received. 139 Although this result is settled under current 
law, the taxation of covered calls has attracted significant attention 
from commentators.140 
Option theory bifurcates Maya's short call into a short sale and a 
risk-free bond. The number of shares that Maya must sell short in 
order to replicate the short call is given by the delta of the call. In our 
case, the delta is 0.5658.141 As Maya's short call covers 10,000 shares, 
she has essentially made a short sale of 5658 shares. A true short sale 
of ABC shares would implicate the constructive sale rules of section 
1259 because Maya holds an appreciated position in 10,000 shares of 
ABC stock. 142 If a short call was equated with short selling, however, 
then Maya would be deemed to have sold 5658 of her owned ABC 
shares short at current fair market value when she wrote the call 
option. 
Note that Maya's gain does not directly depend on the amount of 
the premium she received.143 Maya would have a gain of $169,740,144 
even though she has received a premium of only $36,393. Her gain 
would depend on three factors. First, the delta of the option 
determines the number of shares that were implicitly sold short. 
Second, the fair market value of the stock determines the amount 
realized implicitly. Third, the adjusted basis in the stock Maya actually 
owns is used to determine the amount of gain. 
The delta standard would apply even if the taxpayer pays a 
premium. Let us assume that, rather than selling a call, Maya bought a 
put over 10,000 shares of ABC stock. If we use the same parameters 
/d. 
139 See id. Bittker and Lokken state: 
The earliest expression of this rule is probably found in Virginia Iron Coal 
& Coke Co. v. CIR, 99 F2d [sic] 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1938), where the court 
noted that when the taxpayer received premiums as writer of a call option it 
was impossible to determine whether they were taxable or not. In the event 
the sale should be completed the payments became return of capital, 
taxable only if a profit should be realized on the sale. Should the option be 
surrendered it would then become certain, for the first time, that the 
payments constituted payments in the year in which they were made. 
140 See supra Part III.C.4. 
141 See supra note 137. 
142 See I.R.C. § 1259. 
143 But cf Johnson, supra note 81 (advocating a system for taxing. covered calls 
based on the premium received). 
144 Maya has sold 5658 shares for $30. Her gain is the entire amount realized as 
her adjusted basis is zero. 
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as before, the put would cost her $34,989.145 The delta for the put is 
-0.4342. Thus, buying this put option is the same as implicitly selling 
4342 shares of ABC stock short. Current law does not tax Maya upon 
buying the put, even if she already owns ABC stock. Yet, the delta 
standard of this section would treat Maya as executing a short sale 
over 4342 shares, producing gain of $130,260. 
Thus, option theory gives tax policy a way of dealing with the 
ancient problem of covered calls and the related problem of 
protective puts. In order to ensure consistency between the taxation of 
short sales and the taxation of options, these options should be treated 
as constructive sales (based on the Black-Scholes delta calculation).146 
The example given above shows only the initial consequences of the 
covered call and protective put under the delta model. It does not 
follow through to the end of the options. Exploring the tax 
consequences over the entire life of the options is the goal of the next 
two sections. 
B. Fluctuating Deltas and Constructive Sales 
A possible critique of the delta standard described in Part III 
above is that delta itself fluctuates over the life of an option. 147 If delta 
changes immediately after the covered call or protective put is 
executed, then is it possible to apply the delta model at all? As this 
section will show, fluctuating deltas are not an intractable problem. 
Instead, this section will show that delta acts like a ratchet on 
constructive sales because, like real sales, constructive sales cannot 
ordinarily be undone. So, fluctuations in delta can only increase 
overall constructive sales. 
Let us return to an example from the prior Part VI.A. Maya 
writes a covered call over 10,000 shares of ABC stock in which she has 
a zero basis. The current price of ABC is $30 per share, and the strike 
price of the call is $33 per share. Applying the other assumptions 
given above, we come to a Black-Scholes price on the option of 
$36,393 (or $3.6393 per share). 148 Under current law, the writer of a 
"covered call" has not triggered realization of the owned assets. 
145 In MATLAB, blsprice(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a put price of 3.4989, and 
blsdelta(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a put delta of -0.4342. 
146 This approach is at odds with "the popular conception that 'paper gains' do 
not constitute income." Deborah Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 
57 TAX L. REV. 355, 355-56 (2004). 
147 See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1364-67. 
148 See supra note 137. 
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Under the delta model described in Part II, however, Maya would be 
treated as having executed a short sale over 5658 shares of ABC stock, 
triggering gain under the constructive sale rules. 
Let us also return to the possible walk that the stock took from 
$30 to $35.08 as suggested above.149 There, we examined how the 
position of a call holder could be closely replicated using stock trading 
and borrowing. The position of a call writer is replicated in very 
similar, yet inverse, fashion. Here, we use short selling and investing in 
a risk-free asset. The replication is detailed in the following table. 
Note that positive numbers under "Shares Shorted" represent the 
execution of short sales; negative numbers represent closing of short 
sales. 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 96-97. 
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Option 




Shares from Short Risk-Free 
Week Stock Delta Shorted Selling Interest Asset 
0 $ 30.00 0.5658 5658 $133,347 $0 $133,347 
1 30.31 0.5763 105 3183 256 136,786 
2 31.50 0.6239 476 14,994 263 152,043 
3 32.33 0.6550 311 10,055 292 162,390 
4 34.16 0.7205 655 22,375 312 185,077 
5 36.07 0.7798 593 21,390 356 206,823 
6 36.71 0.7973 175 6424 398 213,645 
7 36.56 0.7930 (43) (1572) 411 212,483 
8 35.62 0.7647 (283) (10,080) 409 202,811 
9 38.09 0.8328 681 25,939 390 229,141 
10 39.78 0.8702 374 14,878 441 244,459 
11 36.39 0.7871 (831) (30,240) 470 214,689 
12 36.92 0.8025 154 5686 413 220,788 
13 33.59 0.6868 (1157) (38,864) 425 182,349 
14 34.21 0.7101 233 7971 351 190,670 
15 35.93 0.7715 614 22,061 367 213,098 
16 37.60 0.8225 510 19,176 410 232,684 
17 40.38 0.8881 656 26,489 447 259,621 
18 39.50 0.8712 (169) (6676) 499 253,444 
19 41.04 0.9027 315 12,928 487 266,859 
20 40.33 0.8909 (118) (4759) 513 262,614 
21 38.74 0.8567 (342) (13,249) 505 249,870 
22 37.42 0.8209 (358) (13,396) 481 236,954 
23 36.94 0.8063 (146) (5393) 456 232,016 
24 36.50 0.7918 (145) (5293) 446 227,170 
25 34.81 0.7242 (676) (23,532) 437 204,075 
26 35.08 0.7356 114 3999 392 208,467 
Total $197,840 $10,627 
True 
Ending Option $ (50,268) 
Synthetic 
Option $ (49,581) 
Initially, the synthetic short call is created by a short sale over 
5658 shares, yielding total proceeds of $169,740. Maya can do what 
she pleases with $36,393 of these proceeds, which represent the 
premium received for the option. The remainder ($133,347) is 
invested in a risk-free asset. Every week, short sales and risk-free 
assets are rebalanced to reflect changes in delta. At the end of week 
twenty-six, the synthetic short call is represented by an outstanding 
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short position over 7356 shares. Because the stock is now at $35.08, it 
would cost $258,048 to close this position. The risk-free asset is worth 
$208,467, and the overall position is a liability of $49,581, which is 
close to the true Black-Scholes value of $50,268. 
Now, however, we must determine how to model constructive 
sales. The fluctuations in delta obviously trigger fluctuations in the 
amount of outstanding short selling. This section of the article will 
model these fluctuations as if short sales had a ratchet effect on 
constructive sales. So, when a taxpayer closes a short sale, it does not 
reverse any constructive sales that were triggered by it. There is a 
technical difficulty with this assumption - the closed-transaction 
exception to the constructive sale rules. Under this exception, a short 
sale does not trigger a constructive sale if (1) the short sale is closed 
within thirty days of the end of the taxable year in which it was made, 
(2) the taxpayer continues to hold the owned stock for at least sixty 
days after the short sale is closed, and (3) during those sixty days the 
taxpayer's risk of loss over the owned stock is not diminished by using 
a call, put, forward, or similar contract.150 Arguably, the taxpayer fails 
(3) while continuing to engage in the delta-hedging strategy, as some 
short sales always remain outstanding. If not, then we have a 
complicated problem.'5' 
Another complicated problem is the fact that the same shares 
could be constructively sold more than one time under section 1259.152 
In the interest of simplicity, I have assumed that constructive sales are 
triggered when (but only when) the total short position exceeds its 
prior maximum. This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of 
section 1259 and with the broader principle that completed sales of 
property cannot be reversed in order to avoid taxable gain. So, we can 
avoid the closed-transaction exception and the possibility of multiple 
constructive sales of the same shares. 
150 I.R.C. §§ 1259(c)(3)(A), 246(c)(4). 
151 The constructive sales for any taxable year would be based on the lesser of (1) 
the highest outstanding short sale for the taxable year or (2) the highest outstanding 
short sale for the period running from thirty to ninety days after the close of the 
taxable year. If prong (2) applied, we would have the additional problem of matching 
the short sales with actual stock prices. 
152 Suppose that delta and the stock follow a path of (1) $30, -40%; (2) $30,-50%, 
(3) $30, -40%, ( 4) $40, -50%. On day two, we have a constructive sale of 0.10 shares at 
$30 because delta declined by 10 basis points. Technically, we should have a new 
constructive sale on day four as well, because delta has again declined by ten basis 
points. Ignoring this constructive sale greatly simplifies the mechanics of the model. 
I.R.C. § 1259( c )(1 ). 
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Now that our assumptions are clarified, let us return to the 
example. The initial short sale potentially leads to a constructive sale 
over 5658 shares. Assuming a zero basis in ABC stock, the call would 
initially trigger gain of $169,740. At the end of the twenty-six week 
position, the short position is even greater, standing at 7356 shares, 
and the maximum short position over the twenty-six week position 
was 9027 at week nineteen. Under the ratchet theory, any increase in 
total short sales over the past all-time high would lead to a new 
constructive sale. Applying this ratchet model to the prior example 
leads to the following schedule of constructive sales and related gain 
(assuming a zero basis for ABC stock). 
Week Stock Delta Constructive Sales Gain Realized 
0 $ 30.00 0.5658 5658 169,740 
1 30.31 0.5763 105 3183 
2 31.50 0.6239 476 14,994 
3 32.33 0.6550 311 10,055 
4 34.16 0.7205 655 22,375 
5 36.07 0.7798 593 21,390 
6 36.71 0.7973 175 6424 
7 36.56 0.7930 - -
8 35.62 0.7647 - -
9 38.09 0.8328 355 13,522 
10 39.78 0.8702 374 14,878 
11 36.39 0.7871 
- -
12 36.92 0.8025 - -
13 33.59 0.6868 - -
14 34.21 0.7101 -
-
15 35.93 0.7715 - -
16 37.60 0.8225 
-
-
17 40.38 0.8881 179 7228 
18 39.50 0.8712 - -
19 41.04 0.9027 146 5992 
20 40.33 0.8909 - -
21 38.74 0.8567 - -
22 37.42 0.8209 
-
-
23 36.94 0.8063 - -
24 36.50 0.7918 - -
25 34.81 0.7242 
-
-
26 35.08 0.7356 - -
Totals 9027 289,779 
As in the prior section, the simple example using ABC stock can 
demonstrate how the components of the synthetic option should be 
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taxed. 153 Yet, as before, the ABC-stock example shows just one path 
that stock may take. Moreover, the twenty-six week period is not long 
enough to explore the full consequences from the deferral regime of 
current law. Measuring the likely value of this deferral requires a 
longer option measured over more numerous paths. 
In summary, this section showed how the delta model could deal 
with fluctuations in delta, which in turn cause fluctuations in the 
implied short-sale position. Fluctuating delta creates some complexity, 
which can be overcome with simplifying assumptions. The approach I 
took treats the short sales as a ratchet that is being applied to 
constructive sales. Constructive sales occur only when the short-sale 
position reaches new highs. Measuring the consequences of these 
constructive sales is the goal of the next section. 
C. A Monte-Carlo Simulation of Constructive Sales 
Let us briefly review the problem of the prior two sections. An 
investor who owns appreciated stock might either write a call (a 
covered call) or buy a put (a protective put). Under current law, the 
investor has almost certainly not realized any gain on the owned stock 
from either the covered call or the protective put. I have argued, 
however, that the policy ideal is to tax options according to their 
constituent transactions. In the context of covered calls and protective 
puts, we would bifurcate the option into a combination of a short sale 
and investment in a risk-free asset. The short sale is what is interesting 
here, because it would cause the investor to realize gain under the 
constructive sale rules of section 1259.154 The delta of the option, 
which fluctuates over time and with movements in the stock, 
determines the amount of short sales outstanding at any given time. 
Thus, the short-sale position fluctuates along with delta. In order to 
simplify the model, I assume that delta acts like a ratchet on short 
sales, which therefore trigger constructive sales only when the total 
amount of short sales exceeds the previous all-time high. The prior 
section ended with an example that illustrates the workings of this 
• 155 
assumptiOn. 
If the investor ultimately sells the stock at the end of the option, 
then the total gain or loss realized is no different if we measure under 
current law or under the delta model. 156 What is different is the timing 
1~3 See supra Part V. 
154 I.R.C. § 1259(c). 
155 See supra Part VI. B. 
156 If the investor died owning the stock, then the basis step up of section 1014 
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of the gain or loss. Because constructive sales generate gain (but not 
losses), the policy ideal given by the delta model will tend to 
accelerate the realization of gain when compared to current law. The 
goal of this section is to measure the value of the deferral given by 
current law and also to examine some practical ways to curtail it 
according to the delta model. 
Let us then return to the long-term example using XYZ stock, 
which was the basis for the Monte-Carlo simulation of Part V. Allow 
me to restate the relevant particulars of the XYZ stock, the options on 




Time to Exercise: 
Volatility: 
Dividends: 
Number of Simulated Paths: 
Black-Scholes Call Price: 
Black-Scholes Put Price: 
Black-Scholes Call Delta: 












Let us assume that an investor owns 10,000 shares of XYZ stock with 
a zero basis. Next, let us examine separately the proper tax treatment 
of a covered call and protective put, each over 10,000 shares of stock. 
Under current law, the investor has no tax consequences from 
either buying the put or from selling the call. (If the investor did both, 
however, he would probably trigger the constructive sale rules.157) 
Current law defers the tax consequences with respect to the shares of 
XYZ stock that the taxpayer owns. The focus of this section is on 
when the gain from the sale of XYZ stock should be recognized. 
Under the simulation, the mean price of the stock is $63.9143 after 
five years.158 Let us assume that the investor plans to sell the stock in 
would effectively eliminate any gain or loss that accumulated before the investor's 
death. I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
157 Since the transaction is not described in the statute, it might not actually be a 
constructive sale as the IRS has not yet issued regulations under section 1259 (despite 
the nine-year-old mandate to do so). Cf Phillip Gall, Phantom Tax Regulations: The 
Curse of Spurned Delegations, 56 TAX LAW. 413 (2003). 
158 Because of the risk-free nature of Black-Scholes pricing, the model assumes 
that stock grows at the risk-free rate. Thus, we should expect the stock to be worth 
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five years, giving him an expected future payoff of $639,143. 
The synthetic short call would be initiated by the short sale of 
7663 shares, and the synthetic long put would be initiated by the short 
sale of 2337 shares. Initially, $38,315 of gain is triggered by selling the 
call, and $11,685 of gain is triggered by buying the put. Afterwards, 
future short sales would be executed or closed to track changes in 
delta, with constructive sales being triggered according to the ratchet 
theory (i.e., whenever total short sales exceeds the previous all-time 
high). 
Since we are assuming the investor would sell the stock in five 
years, the constructive sales do not increase the sum of the gain 
realized. 159 The constructive sales do, however, affect the timing of 
gain recognition. In order to measure the benefit of deferring gain, the 
simulation measures the constructive sale each day. This series of sales 
can then be projected to future value.160 Those results are the basis for 
the following table, which further breaks the future value number 
down between the sum of the gain (i.e., what is taxed under current 
law), the time-value of money on the initial constructive sale, and the 
time-value of money on interim constructive sales. 
Means Measured Over 2000 Observations 
Short Call Long Put 
Sum of Gain on Owned Stock 639,143 639,143 
(Current Law) 
TVM of Initial Constructive 108,816 33,185 
Sale 
TVM of Interim Constructive 19,569 28,014 
Sales 
Future Value of Gains 767,528 700,342 
(Policy Ideal) 
The first row of numbers (Sum of Gain) represents what current 
law taxes. Recall that we are concerned about the taxation of the 
XYZ stock itself. The gain realized on the stock is not affected by 
whether the investor enters into an option contract; so we see the 
SO*e"(S%*5)=64.2013 after five years. The result given by the simulation, 63.9143, is 
a close approximation. 
159 The investor can adjust his basis in the stock in order to reflect constructive 
sales. See I.R.C. § 1259(a)(2)(A). 
160 Also, the entire holdings of stock are liquidated at the end of the five years. 
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same number in both columns. The second row is the time value of 
money attributable to the initial short sale implicit in the option. 
Under the assumptions of this section, a constructive sale is triggered 
immediately when the investor enters into the option. This initial 
constructive sale is given by the delta of the option. The second row 
describes the benefit taxpayers receive from deferring this initial gain. 
The third row represents the time value of money attributable to 
subsequent constructive sales generated under the ratchet theory 
developed in Part VI.B. 
Another way of viewing the numbers is that the first row is what 
the law actually accomplishes, the second row is what the law could 
conceivably accomplish, and the third row is what the law probably 
cannot reach. Imputing a constructive sale on the execution of the 
option may be practical. But it might not be practical to impute 
constructive sales based on interim fluctuations in delta. Doing so 
would require frequent (perhaps daily) tracking of stock prices and 
recalculation of the short sales implied by the options. Moreover, 
much of the prior section dealt with the practical difficulties of 
modeling the constructive sales produced by interim fluctuations in 
delta. Nonetheless, it might be practical to impute a constructive sale 
based upon the initial delta of an option. Indeed, most of the time 
value of money that is lost under current law can be attributable to the 
initial constructive sale. After all, the initial constructive sale is the 
largest in size and the earliest in time. 
In summary, this section used the same set of stock prices used in 
Part V.B, the set containing 2000 separate random walks, each of 
which is 1800 days long. This section then reported the results of a 
Monte-Carlo simulation of the constructive sales that would be 
triggered by a covered call and a protective put. The simulation shows 
that current law results in a significant amount of deferral when 
compared to the policy ideal of the delta model. Fully implementing 
the delta model may be impractical, however, as doing so would 
involve frequent recalculation of delta. That being said, a very large 
amount of the unwarranted deferral can be eliminated simply by 
determining using the initial delta of the option and ignoring interim 
fluctuations. The next section attempts to extend this approach to 
certain combinations of covered calls and protective puts known as 
equity collars and variable prepaid forward contracts. 
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D. Applying the Delta Model to Equity Collars and Variable Prepaid 
Forwards 
Under the delta model developed by this section, a covered call or 
a protective put triggers a constructive sale of a portion of the stock 
owned by an investor. The amount of the constructive sale is given by 
the delta of the option, calculated at the time the option is executed. 
Later increases in delta would ideally trigger more constructive sales, 
but measuring those later constructive sales is impractical. This 
section extends this delta model to two close substitutes for short 
sales: an equity collar and a variable prepaid forward contract. 
As noted in Part III.B, an equity collar combines a short call with 
a long put. Typically the investor also owns appreciated shares of the 
stock covered by the option and wishes to hedge against future 
movements in the stock, but without incurring the tax liability that 
comes with selling the stock. Even though the exercise price on the 
short call will be higher than on the long put, the position is 
economically very similar to a short sale. In fact, the goal of a tax 
planners is to have the collar replicate a short sale as closely as 
possible while safely avoiding the constructive sale rules. 
Dean Schizer mentioned a delta model for equity collars 
previously, but ultimately dismissed it on political and technical 
grounds. 161 The political argument is that taxpayers and their advisors 
would effectively oppose a delta model.162 Perhaps so, but perhaps tax 
shelters like equity collars and variable prepaid collars will become an 
appealing target for a Congress that wants to expand spending or cut 
overall tax rates. Dean Schizer's technical critique is that calculating 
the delta of an equity collar is impracticable or impossible.163 Recall, 
however, that an equity collar is simply a short call and a long put 
combined. The delta for such a combination is simply the sum of the 
delta of the two pieces. 164 
161 Dean Schizer is also concerned that subjecting equity collars to a wider 
application of the constructive sale rules would lead to "lock in" and push taxpayers 
into less effective hedges. See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1365. The lock-in rationale is 
usually invoked to support a capital-gains preference and is controversial among 
commentators. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 94, 'll 3.5.7. This critique 
has lost any vitality that it may have once had after the capital gains rate was cut to 
15% in 2001. 
162 Schizer, supra note 42, at 1366. 
163 ld. at 1365--Q6. 
164 Readers with calculus will easily see why. Delta is the first partial derivative of 
the instrument price taken with respect to the stock price. So, if an equity collar is the 
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Consider an example from Dean Schizer's article. Suppose that a 
share of stock is currently worth $100. The spread on the collar is from 
$95 to $115.165 Suppose that the volatility is 40%, the risk-free rate is 
5%, and the time to expiration is three years.166 The collar has a value 
of $10.97. The put (with exercise price of $95) costs the investor 
$16.50. The call (with exercise price of $115) brings the investor 
$27.47. Thus, the investor would receive the difference ($10.97) under 
the Black-Scholes formula. The delta of the collar is -90%, composed 
of the put delta (-26%) minus the call delta (64%). Even though this 
transaction does not trigger the constructive sale rules, it is very close 
in effect to a conventional short sale. A pure short sale would have 
delta of -100%, compared with the -90% delta for the collar. 
But what if we do not know what the volatility of the stock 
actually is? We do know the output of a function (the instrument 
price) and all inputs but one. Unfortunately, the Black -Scholes 
equation cannot be inverted to derive an analytic solution for the 
unknown input.167 However, the solution in any particular case can be 
found using numerical methods.168 
Suppose that we have a collar on a stock that lasts for three years. 
The stock is currently worth $100, and the collar spread is from $90 to 
$110. The risk-free rate is 5%. The investor receives $11 for the collar. 
If we thought that the $11 received was the true Black-Scholes value, 
then the parameters just given would imply a volatility of about 15% 
on the stock and a delta of the collar of about -77%.169 Yet, the $11 
sum of a long put and short call, then the delta for the equity collar is the sum of the 
delta of the long put and the short call. 
16~ See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1345-46. 
166 See id. at 1350 n.129. 
167 See HULL, supra note 8, at 250. 
168 The sought after volatility is on the stock. Theoretically, one could observe 
the prices of other options to derive the volatility of the stock. One problem is that 
most options in the United States are sold over-the-counter. Publicly traded options 
are of relatively short term, typically under two years. If publicly traded options were 
three to five years long, investors could combine them to create equity collars without 
the need to involve the investment bankers. The volatility observed on a short-term 
option may not carry over to a long-term option. This is because of the "volatility 
smile" - the phenomenon that implied volatility depends on the strike price and time 
to exercise of an instrument. I d. at 330, 334-37. 
169 Recall that this collar is created by buying a put with a strike price of $90 and 
writing a call with a strike price of $110. The Black-Scholes price for the put is given 
in MATLAB by blsprice(lOO, 90, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns $1.98. The price for 
the collar is given by blsprice(100, 110, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns $12.98. As we 
can see, the volatility of 15.05% is consistent with the $11 received for entering this 
collar. We can use this volatility to find the delta of the collar, which is the delta of the 
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may be less than the true Black-Scholes value. Dean Schizer reports 
that the typical fee on an equity collar is 1% of the hedged asset's 
value for every year the collar is open. In our example, this is $3. So, 
in the present example, the charge would be $3 (1% times $100 times 
three years). If we were sure that the investment bank was charging a 
commission of $3,170 then we could calculate implied volatility by 
assuming the investor received $14. This implies volatility of about 
32% and a delta of about -88%. A delta model for taxing equity 
collars might, for ease of administration, ignore the banker's fee when 
calculating the delta on the collar. In the example just given, assuming 
that the price received is the true Black-Scholes price leads to a lower 
delta and thus a lower constructive sale. Using this simplification, we 
would assume a constructive sale with respect to 77% of the shares 
covered by the collar, rather than 88%. 
The approach just described can be extended to variable prepaid 
forward contracts (VPFC). VPFCs are structured as forward contracts 
but are, in essence, modified equity collars. Recall that an investor 
executes an equity collar with a protective put having a low strike 
price and a covered call having a higher strike price. The key 
modification with the VPFC is that the call covers fewer shares than 
the put.171 The fraction covered by the call is usually the high strike 
price divided by the price of the stock at the time the VPFC is 
executed. For example, suppose that we have a VPFC on a stock that 
lasts for three years. The stock is currently worth $100, and the 
implied collar spread is from $100 to $125. If the put portion of the 
VPFC covers 10,000 shares, then the call portion would cover only 
8000 shares.172 We might also think of the VPFC payoff as combining a 
traditional equity collar over 8000 shares plus an additional protective 
put over 2000 shares. The following graph will hopefully illuminate 
the difference between an equity collar and a VPFC. 
put minus the delta of the call. Recall that we subtract the call delta because the 
investor is writing, not buying, the call. The delta of the put is given by blsdelta(100, 
90, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns -0.1335. The delta of the call is given by 
blsdelta(lOO, 110, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns 0.6331. Thus, the delta for the collar 
is -0.7666. 
170 1% of $100 for each of the three years. 
171 The variable prepaid forward contracts (VPFC) has the same cash flows as the 
modified equity collar combined with a loan equal to the value of the shares at the 
time the VPFC is executed. See generally David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax 
Treatment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing 
Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3 
FLA. TAX REV. 471 (1997). 
112 10,000 * 100/125. 
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The VPFC can be taxed according to the delta model if we can 
extract an implied volatility. Once we have an implied volatility for 
the stock, calculating delta for the VPFC is trivially easy. 
Unfortunately, doing this is trickier than it was with the equity collar 
for two reasons. First, ignoring the banker's fee may now harm, rather 
than help, the taxpayer. Second, even if we can factor the banker's fee 
into the valuation, the VPFC might actually imply two separate 
volatilities, which would lead to two separate deltas. 
Return to the prior example and suppose the risk-free rate is 5% 
and the taxpayer receives a net amount of $0 for entering the VPFC. 
We might be ready to find an implied volatility of 54.29% and a delta 
of -78.65%, as they correspond with a Black -Scholes value of zero. 
But, we need to recall that the value observed will lower than the true 
Black-Scholes value because of the investment bank's fee. We could 
disregard this with the collar, because using the lower observed value 
simply lowered the implied volatility and the magnitude of delta, 
working to the benefit of the taxpayer. Our situation is more 
ambiguous with the VPFC. Assume that the true value of the position 
is really $1.50, which the investment bank keeps as its fees. This value 
actually implies two volatilities (10.20% and 24.57%) and two deltas 
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( -47.20% and -69.90% ). In this example, we might feel safe choosing 
the 24.57% volatility, as it is more typical for stocks. But, the choice 
may not always be so clear. 
The failure to achieve perfection should not, however, be an 
argument against the delta model. Even if the taxpayer chiseled the 
government in the above example and claimed a 10.20% implied 
volatility (and a -47.20% delta), he is still being subjected to a 
constructive sale of 47.20% of his holdings of the stock. This is clearly 
an improvement over the complete deferral allowed by current law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article set out to analyze the proper taxation of options to 
buy or sell stock. In the Introduction, I described a call option that 
Maya buys that entitles her to buy 10,000 shares of XMPL stock for 
$100 in five years. Current law imposes no tax consequences on Maya 
until she exercises the option, it lapses, or she sells it. This approach is 
probably the best. We can bifurcate Maya's option into a synthetic 
option, initially composed of 7500 shares of XMPL and $400,000 of 
borrowing. Theoretically, Maya should be taxed as based on the 
synthetic option. However, the Monte-Carlo simulation above 
demonstrates that doing so is not materially different from the results 
produced by current law. Thus, current law passes a very strong test 
when we examine the option in isolation (i.e., naked options). 
We have a very different result if Maya sold the option and 
already owns 10,000 appreciated shares in XMPL. Here, the synthetic 
option is represented by the sale, or short sale, of 7500 shares of 
XMPL. If Maya sells 7500 shares of stock she already owns- or if she 
sells 7500 shares short - then she must pay tax on the gain. Thus, she 
should face a constructive sale on 7500 shares when she sells a call. A 
similar result applies if Maya buys a protective put or enters into a 
more complex contract that combines covered calls and protective 
puts. The two contracts discussed in this article were equity collars 
and variable prepaid contracts, both of which should trigger 
immediate taxable gain as well. 
Thus, the primary shortcoming of current law is that the 
constructive sale rules of section 1259 do not apply to covered calls, 
protective puts, and related contracts. Otherwise, option taxation 
seems to work fine. 
On a broader level, I hope that the approach of this article will 
reinvigorate the use of bifurcation techniques by scholars and 
policymakers. Financial theory supplies a rich, if arcane, set of tools 
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that potentially allows us to break down financial contracts into 
fundamental units like stock and borrowing. Taxing financial contracts 
strictly according to their fundamental units may be impracticable. 
But, the approach gives us a normative baseline to use when selecting 
from the set of administratively and politically feasible methods of 
taxation. 
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APPENDIX A: STEPS IN DELTA HEDGING 
1. Determine the initial value of the option using the Black-
Scholes formula. 
a. For a call, this value is "c". 
b. For a put, this value is "p". 
2. Determine the initial delta (~) of the option using a formula 
related to Black-Scholes. 
3. Note the current price of the stock (S). 
4. Create a synthetic option or replicating portfolio in the 
following manner. (Note that in each case the initial cash flow 
for the synthetic option is the same as for a true option.) 
a. Long call: Purchase ~ shares of stock. This costs ~*S. 
This is financed by an out-of-pocket contribution equal 
to c. The remainder, ~*S-c, is obtained by borrowing. 
b. Short call: Sell short ~ shares of stock. This produces 
proceeds of ~*S. Of this, place the premium, c, in the 
investor's pocket. (This represents the premium 
payment that a call writer receives.) The remainder, 
~*S-c, is used to purchase a debt instrument. 
c. Long put: Sell short negative ~ shares of stock. (Note 
that delta for a put is already negative.) Use these 
proceeds, plus an out-of-pocket contribution equal to 
p, to buy a debt instrument. (Recall that a put writer 
must pay a premium to buy a put.) 
d. Short put: Purchase negative ~ shares of stock. Borrow 
~*S to do this. Borrow an additional amount, p, to 
place in the investor's pocket. This amount represents 
the premium received. 
5. Every day (or week or hour or other period) rebalance the 
synthetic option. Passage of time and movements in the stock 
price cause changes in delta. The synthetic option is 
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rebalanced when the position in the stock is adjusted to 
reflect the new delta. 
a. Long call: Always make sure that the number of shares 
owned equals delta. If delta rises, buy more stock using 
more borrowing. If delta falls, sell stock and use the 
proceeds to pay of the existing borrowing. 
b. Short call: Always make sure that the number of shares 
shorted equals delta. If delta rises, sell more stock 
short and use the proceeds to increase the investment 
in the debt instrument. If delta falls, close short sales; 
as the investor must buy shares to close the short sales, 
he will obtain the needed funds by liquidating a 
portion of the debt instrument. 
c. Long put: Always make sure that the number of shares 
shorted equals negative delta. If delta rises (e.g., from 
-50% to -40% ), close short sales, obtaining funds from 
the debt instrument. If delta falls (e.g., from -50% to 
-60% ), engage in more short selling, investing the new 
proceeds in the debt instrument. 
d. Short put: Always make sure that the number of shares 
owned equals negative delta. If delta rises (e.g., from 
-50% to -40% ), sell stock, using the proceeds to pay off 
borrowing. If delta falls (e.g., from -50% to -60% ), buy 
more stock, borrowing more funds to pay for the 
purchase. 
